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Introduction
Clausewitz’s writings have long been the subject of scholarly debate. Historians and
political scientists alike have expressed a spectrum of views on the relevance of his theories on
modern conflicts. Some have argued that Clausewitz’s On War is replete with so many
theoretical axioms and exceptions that anyone can claim Clausewitzian principles support their
view on a military conflict.1 Conversely, others have claimed that the lessons contained therein
show “a theory of war, the elements of which appear to be universal and timeless.”2 John Keegan
is perhaps the most prominent anti-Clausewitz military historian. In his expansive The History of
War, he criticized one of Clausewitz’s most prolific contributions to the study of armed conflict:
the notion that “war is the continuation of politics by other means.”3 For Keegan, culture was
“the great determinant of how human beings conduct themselves,” and Clausewitz failed to
acknowledge that war was “always an expression of culture,” not politics. Likewise, Keegan
claimed that Clausewitz evaluated only regular warfare, excluding unconventional actors such as
the Cossacks.4 This view has been flatly rejected by scholars who claim Keegan undervalued the
complexity of Clausewitz’s military philosophy and failed to acknowledge the relationship
between culture and policy.5
However, not all commentators adopt a black-or-white view of Clausewitz. Manabrata
Guha, for example, has argued that Clausewitzian theory is durable because Clausewitz expected
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University Press, 1976), 87.
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the character of war – who wages it, how it is waged – to change, while the nature of it – the
concepts that govern war – remains the same.6 There are many who claim that while particular
aspects of the theory are still relevant, they have been misinterpreted by the military leadership.
Colin Fleming has asserted that the concept of the Trinity – the wartime balance among the
people, the government, and the army – has been misconstrued, and the original idea remains
applicable today.7 Likewise, Antulio Echevarria has highlighted how the “center of gravity”
concept continues to inform perspectives on contemporary conflicts.8 I share in the view that
certain Clausewitzian principles remain relevant today, and will evaluate several concepts from
Clausewitz’s magnum opus, On War. The scope of this project will be limited to three of
Clausewitz’s views on military conflict, and they will be evaluated in both the Soviet and
American wars in Afghanistan. This study will reveal important insights into both conflicts and
will also reinforce the view that Clausewitz’s On War remains a source of guidance for modern
conflict.
Both the Soviet and US armed forces at times relied heavily on conventional strategies
and tactics in conflicts that turned into unconventional wars with insurgent groups. Conventional
warfare is defined by an absence of guerilla/insurgent fighting and is “conducted without the use
of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.”9 “Unconventional warfare” refers to “activities
conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a
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Manabrata Guha, Reimagining War in the 21st Century: From Clausewitz to Network-Centric Warfare
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(Summer 2003), Gale Onefile.
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government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and
guerrilla force in a denied area.”10 According to the U.S. Department of Defense, an
“insurgency” is defined as “the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or
challenge political control of a region.”11 Conversely, “counterinsurgency” or “COIN” refers to
“comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain
insurgency and address its root causes.”12 A similar term that will be used in this paper is
“irregular warfare,” which describes “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for
legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).”13
In a 2014 article titled “From Limited War to Limited Victory: Clausewitz and Allied
Strategy in Afghanistan,” Christopher Griffin argues that Clausewitz’s theories have been
undervalued by some modern scholars, and highlights several Clausewitzian principles that can
be used to help explain the ISAF experience in Afghanistan.14 In this paper, I will apply several
of these concepts to the Soviet experience in Afghanistan. I will also revise and add to Dr.
Griffin’s analysis of the war against the Taliban. While I agree with most of Griffin’s assertions,
there are some areas of disagreement. Clausewitz defined the “culminating point” as the moment
at which an offensive has reached its maximum point of defensible extension.15 I offer a clearer
culminating point, whereas Griffin says only that the chances for a culminating point of victory
passed the U.S. after 2006.
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I also offer a method of comparison that uses Clausewitz’s culminating points and an
“counterinsurgent acceptance point” (CAP) to identify analogous points in the Soviet and
American wars in Afghanistan. The CAP is my own idea. I believe it is an appropriate
counterpoint to the culminating point, which for both the Soviets and Americans occurred right
before the respective armies transitioned from largely conventional warfare to
counterinsurgency. The CAP then marks the turning point when the insurgents denied the
counterinsurgents a strictly military victory, and the political leadership was forced to publicly
acknowledge the failure of the COIN policy for the first time. I believe these two points of
comparison can be used in comparative studies of other conflicts as well.
In Chapter 2, I consider the perspective Clausewitz had on force size and concentration as
it applies to both conflicts. Clausewitz advocated for the use of overwhelming force that was
concentrated in the regions that posed the greatest threat to the objectives of the invading state.
An analysis of Soviet and American troop deployments and resources will reveal how both
countries failed to deploy an adequate force into Afghanistan early in the war, and were unable
to concentrate troops in the problem regions. I will also argue that both the Soviet and American
leadership were made aware of the Clausewitzian view on mass and concentration by members
of the military, but disregarded it in favor of a modest deployment and concentration approach.
In Chapter 3, I analyze Clausewitz’s war aims framework, which describes the trajectory
warfighting should follow, and the importance of maintaining parity between political and
military aims and the means deployed to achieve them. I argue that – while there were significant
differences between U.S. and Soviet objectives throughout each conflict – both struggled to
adapt their goals and methods. A key aspect of Clausewitz’s war aims framework is the
increasingly political nature a conflict takes on once military objectives prove impossible to

4

attain. This seemingly basic concept sheds light on the quagmires both superpowers experienced
in Afghanistan.
Literature Review
Insurgencies have occurred around the world for hundreds of years. Logically, the study
of insurgencies has ebbed and flowed with their prevalence. Most of these popular uprisings
have been unsuccessful.16 In the 20th century, the aftermath of World War I “created the opening
and opportunities within international politics for revolutionaries to seize and hold power,” but
with few exceptions – southern Ireland and China – the rebellions were crushed.17 Up until the
1960s, insurgencies were on the periphery of military study, growing in popularity after the end
of the Cold War and once again with the wars in Afghanistan (2001-Present) and Iraq (2003Present).18 Scholars, insurgents, and counterinsurgents have presented many frameworks and
theories that consider this type of warfare from multiple perspectives.
One of the earliest modern guides to insurgencies was Mao Zedong’s On Guerilla
Warfare. Written as an instruction manual for successful insurrection while Mao led the
Communist guerillas in China during the 1930s, it describes the stages of rebellion and the
transition from irregular to regular warfare over the course of a “protracted war.”19 David Galula,
a French officer who based his theories on the Algerian revolution, wrote another foundational
text for the study of irregular conflict. His Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice
was published in 1964. It offered a framework for rooting out insurgencies that emphasized an
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MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 202.
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extended time commitment and holistic “clear, hold, build” strategies for the counterinsurgents.20
Seen as a bedrock of modern COIN strategy, his guide heavily influenced Army Field Manual 324, the U.S. Army’s 2006 framework for addressing the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.21
Written by General Petraus and James Amos, Manual 3-24 sought to provide a framework that
would inform the U.S. military on how to combine “combat tasks and skills more often
associated with nonmilitary agencies” to defeat insurgencies.22
Either explicitly or implicitly, Clausewitz’s influence can be seen in all these texts. Mao
Zedong’s On Guerilla Warfare drew heavily from On War, including the chapter that directly
addresses insurgent uprisings: “The People In Arms.”23 Likewise, John Galula’s CounterInsurgency Warfare – cited extensively in Army Field Manual 3-24 – adapted Clausewitz’s
definition of war to define insurgency as “the pursuit of the policy of a party, inside a country, by
every means.”24 Moreover, in 2014, in line with Clausewitz’s emphasis on the political aspects
of military conflict, the Army Field Manual 3-24 was updated to include a greater focus on the
political objectives of COIN policy.25 As for direct study of Clausewitz, it was only in the late
1970s that American and British scholars began to analyze his work. Jan Willem Honig and
others have observed that the publication of Michael Howard and Peter Paret’s 1976 translation
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International, 2006).
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of On War sparked the “Clausewitz Renaissance.”26 Widely accepted as the standard translation,
this edition will be used for my study.
In 2015, Christopher Daase and James W. Davis translated and edited On Small War, a
collection of Clausewitz’s lecture notes and memoranda concerning small-unit and militia
warfare, as well as a new translation of “The People in Arms,” the only chapter from On War
explicitly about asymmetric, unconventional conflict.27 While these texts pertain more closely to
irregular warfare, they have been studied and debated extensively. Hence, my study will look at
several other concepts in On War that I believe are applicable to the wars in Afghanistan, despite
lying outside of Clausewitz’s writings explicitly concerning irregular conflict.
Research Questions
1. Do parts of Carl von Clausewitz’s On War remain relevant to contemporary
counterinsurgencies?
2. Using Clausewitz’s concepts of culminating points, mass & concentration, and war aims,
what insights can be gained from a comparative analysis of the Soviet and American wars
in Afghanistan?
Thesis
In this paper, I will argue the following:
A. Certain Clausewitzian concepts apply to modern insurgencies and can be used to help
explain the military failure in Afghanistan. I will evaluate the application of Clausewitz’s

26

Jan Willem Honig, “Clausewitz’s On War: Problems of Text and Translation,” in Clausewitz in the
Twenty-First Century, ed. Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), 73.
Note: For more on the debate regarding Clausewitz’s relevance to contemporary conflict, see
“Introduction.”
27
Carl von Clausewitz, Clausewitz on Small War, ed. Christopher Daase and James W. Davis (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2015).
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culminating points, mass & concentration, and war aims to the Soviet and American wars in
Afghanistan.
B. Identifying when a non-military resolution to a conflict becomes a choice the political
leadership accepts – referred to as the “counterinsurgent acceptance point” (CAP) in this study –
is an idea I have developed that provides a point of comparison to the culminating point.
Considered together, the culminating point and counterinsurgent acceptance point provide a
standardized model for comparative conflict analysis that can be applied to other wars as a
means to identify analogous moments across many conflicts.
Methodology & Scope
This study will focus on the military developments in the Soviet (1979-1989) and the
U.S. (2001-Present) wars in Afghanistan, and will use Carl Von Clausewitz’s theories to explain
some of the shortcomings of the counterinsurgents in both conflicts. Some scholars have decried
the lack of case studies about insurgencies.28 This study will seek to contribute to the literature
on the enduring concepts that have defined contemporary insurgencies. The Soviet and American
experiences present two instances in which global superpowers attempted – and failed – to
achieve their military objectives against insurgents. Given these events, Afghanistan remains one
of the world’s most complex geopolitical issues. The wars I will be analyzing present a unique
opportunity to study two irregular conflicts within one country. To this end, my paper will look
at primary and secondary sources that detail the decisions of the respective militaries and
insurgents. Political and military histories as well as interviews and documents will be used to
provide context and evidence for this study. In regard to scope, the first chapter will limit the
paper to an evaluation of military decisions up until the counterinsurgent acceptance point in
28

See Ian Beckett, “The Historiography of Insurgency,” in The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and
Counterinsurgency (Florence: Routledge, 2012).
8

each conflict (February 1987 and September 2007, respectively). This time frame provides
distinct points of comparison and allows Clausewitz’s concepts to be evaluated with events for
which there is a substantial body of information available. Limiting my analysis up to the CAP
thereby permits more recent developments in the U.S. war in Afghanistan – which lack extensive
historical documentation – to be excluded.

9

Chapter I
The Soviet and American Wars in Afghanistan: Points of Comparison
Culminating Points
In On War, Carl Von Clausewitz’s seminal treatise on armed conflict, Clausewitz
discusses the numerous elements that make up offensive and defensive military operations. Book
Seven, Chapters Five and Twenty-Two present his culminating point theory. Clausewitz writes
that often during offensive operations, “the force of an attack gradually diminishes” and the
“advantages that may become valuable at the peace table” must be paid for “on the spot.”29
According to him, unlike the rare culminating point of victory (which will be discussed later in
this chapter), most armies achieve a culminating point “where their remaining strength is just
enough to maintain a defense and wait for peace.”30 Any progress by the aggressor after the
culminating point has been attained is increasingly susceptible to a reversal in fortune, as the
invading army’s energy and resources decline over the course of an offensive.31 The following
section identifies the initial Soviet and American culminating points in Afghanistan, and also
assesses whether they met, surpassed, or fell short of the respective armies capabilities at the
time. Deciphering and analyzing the moment at which the prospects for achieving military
objectives were highest will provide a point of comparison to when the situation began to favor
the insurgency.
There are always debates on whether a military offensive reached, surpassed, or fell short
of the ideal culminating point. For example, some argue that the U.S. overstepped its initial
military successes during the Korean War (1950-53) and fell short of further success in the First

29

Clausewitz, On War, 639.
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
30
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Gulf War (1990-91). In Korea, the U.S. army has been criticized for pushing too far north and
overextending itself.32 This extension beyond the true culminating point, it has been claimed, led
to higher casualties and ultimately a weaker negotiating position. The First Gulf War, on the
other hand, saw U.S. forces attain their military objectives, but – despite their capabilities –
decide not to pursue and destroy Saddam Hussein’s forces in Iraq. In this case, it has been
alleged that the culminating point was not attained.33 While they are debatable and difficult to
pinpoint, culminating points nonetheless provide a period of time that can be useful in evaluating
the high-water marks of military operations to better understand conflicts and their most difficult
military questions.
In the Soviet war in Afghanistan, February 1980 can be considered as the culminating
point for the Soviet Union because it occurred after the 40th Army took control of the cities and
main roads, and before it embarked on the many unsuccessful forays into rebel territory. These
later attempts at achieving military objectives would come to define the conflict and lead to the
army’s retreat. The major operations after February 1980 failed to gain territory for the
communist government, and the few garrisons that were established in the rural parts of the
country did not yield any strategic or tactical advantages for the Soviets. In the U.S. war in
Afghanistan, the United States reached its culminating point in December 2001, when the
Taliban gave up its last stronghold in Kandahar province. The resurgence of the Taliban since
then has prevented the U.S. and its allies from achieving the broad territorial control and stability
the U.S. army possessed during the first two months after its invasion. Before an analysis of the
wars in Afghanistan can be undertaken, a historical overview of the conflict is necessary.

32

Patrick J. Garrity, “The Parameters of Victory,” Claremont Review of Books, August 15, 2012,
https://claremontreviewofbooks.com/digital/the-parameters-of-victory/.
33
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Historical Background to the Soviet Culminating Point
The last king of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, ruled from 1933-1973, overseeing an
expansion of the central government and the creation of economic infrastructure and state
institutions. The reach of the national government was limited by access and resources, however,
and traditional tribal structures and practices governed the rural regions where Kabul’s presence
was virtually nonexistent.34 Notably, the King’s four decade reign was a time of unusual peace in
Afghanistan. Prior to Shah’s reign, the British clashed with Afghan troops in three separate
conflicts between 1830 and 1920, ending with the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1919, which formally
delineated an independent Afghanistan from British India. In the 1960s, Shah instituted modest
reforms that led to political liberalization, enhanced the education system, and provided new
voting rights for women, a move that was considered to be controversial by the more
conservative parts of the country.35
Zahir Shah was deposed in a bloodless coup by his brother-in-law and former prime
minister, Daud Khan, in 1973. After Daud took power, he sought to consolidate his influence by
banning every political party. Some Islamists were jailed, while others fled to Pakistan, where
they sought refuge and built up their political and military resistance to the Daud regime. Ahmad
Shah Massoud, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and Burhanuddin Rabbani were just a few of the
individuals who escaped to Pakistan during this era and would go on to become key
changemakers in Afghanistan’s future.36 Daud’s repressive tendencies, however, were not

34

Ali Ahmad Jalali, A Military History of Afghanistan: From the Great Game to the Global War on
Terror, (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2017), 331.
35
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gin-email.
36
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limited to Islamists, as he routinely persecuted communist elements in the government and
sought to establish ties with nearby Islamic countries.37
Like virtually all conflicts in the second half of the 20th century, the Cold War played a
key role in the lead up and prosecution of the Soviet war in Afghanistan. The country was an
unaligned state under the leadership of both Shah and Daud as it sought to maximize its
economic and military support from both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Humorously, Daud was
rumored to have said that he wanted “to light his American cigarette with a Russian match.”38
Between 1935-54, there were repeated unsuccessful attempts by the Afghans to get military aid
from the United States, which did not consider the landlocked country to be an important
regional actor. The USSR, on the other hand, vied for influence over the country. In 1955,
Moscow announced that Pashtunistan should be independent from Pakistan – an important
gesture in Afghanistan’s favor – and began to provide the country with economic and military
support.39 The United States then followed suit.
By the 1970s, Afghanistan had a robust trade relationship with the USSR but continued
to welcome American military advisors and economic aid.40 Seeking close ties with both
superpowers, however, came with consequences. When Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev told
Daud that he wanted the Western advisers to leave Afghanistan, Daud angrily responded that
Afghanistan was an independent country that would not be forced to make decisions by
foreigners.41 While this exchange soured Daud’s relationship with Brezhnev, it would be the

37
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Afghan leader’s internal political battles that would end his reign. Despite Daud’s attempts to
purge the government of communists, a coup by military regiments representing the People’s
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) led to his overthrow. Dubbed the Saur (April)
Revolution, the events transpired in April 1978 after the PDPA leaders quickly initiated a
military attack on Daud’s palace amidst an escalation of arrests. The communists used tanks and
air bombers to swiftly overtake the royal palace, killing Daud and many other government
officials.42
The Soviet role in the revolution has been a mystery. While the USSR had supported the
PDPA, the Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan and other senior diplomats were unaware of the
coup until it happened.43 Tellingly, TASS, the official Soviet news agency, referred to the events
as a “coup” and not a “people’s revolution” for the first three days after it occurred.44 The
PDPA’s leaders, meanwhile, proclaimed the victory as a different, and perhaps even superior
iteration of communist revolution. Nur Muhamed Taraki, who became the President and Prime
Minister of Afghanistan following the overthrow, announced that he had added to MarxistLeninist theory by using the military for the socialist agenda. Other Afghan Communists
described the Saur Revolution as equally important to the Russian October Revolution.45
Events on the ground, however, told a different story. As Ali Ahmad Jalali noted, “The
Communist takeover, nevertheless, was a rebellion by the military assets of one faction of the
Communist party with no significant following in the country and no sociopolitical prerequisites
of a revolution.”46 Furthermore, the PDPA was split into two warring factions. Parcham (Banner)
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William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars, (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 26.
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was led by Babrak Karmal and had the support of urban intellectuals seeking rapid change.
Khalq (Masses or People), was led by Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, and was popular amongst
agrarian and more gradualist-minded citizens.47 While they formed a joint government, the
Khalqists effectively exiled the most prominent Parchamists by assigning them to ambassadorial
posts. As instability increased, the Khalq faction resorted to mass arrests and torture, persecuting
Parchamists as well as anticommunist dissidents.48
Soviet advisers repeatedly told Taraki to end the brutal repressions and open the party to
a broader ideological base, but he did not heed their advice. In March 1979, the Afghan city of
Herat and the nearby villages rebelled against the communists, sacking socialist symbols and
murdering public officials. Fearing the mobs, Taraki desperately asked the Soviets to intervene.
After four days of internal debate, the Politburo agreed to send extra military supplies but refused
to send armed forces. Alexei Kosygin, the Soviet Prime Minister, told Taraki: “If we sent in our
troops, the situation in your country would not improve...Our troops would have to struggle not
only with an external aggressor, but with a part of your own people. And people do not forgive
that kind of thing.”49
In September, a KGB assessment found that the Taraki-Amin administration was losing
popularity as they continued their repressive policies and tried to handle political problems
militarily. It recommended that the PDPA institute reforms that would allow clergy members,
some exiled dissidents, and minorities to become members.50 Many who opposed the PDPA
were joining the resistance fighters, growing the armed threat to the regime. The Afghan Army
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began to shrink, as young conscripts and their commanders defected.51 In July 1978, an anticommunist uprising took full control of the Panjshir Valley, and the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan (DRA) forces were unable to retake it. The USSR was split on how to address the
tide of issues threatening the fledgling communist state. The Soviet military was more supportive
of the Khalq faction since the officers in the Afghan army tended to be Khalqists. The KGB,
however, attributed the PDPA’s issues with Taraki’s repressive policies and saw Babrak Karmal
and the Parcham faction as the preferred communist vanguard.52 In July 1979, the Carter
administration approved about $500,000 in non-lethal aid to the rebels, formally beginning U.S.
clandestine support for the mujahedin.53
On October 8th, Amin’s men murdered Taraki, precipitating a series of events that led to
the Soviet invasion. Amin did not end Taraki’s oppressive policies. Citing Stalin, he ignored the
advice of his Soviet advisors, and continued to terrorize the populace. While estimates vary, the
infamous Pul-i Charkhi prison is believed to have been the site of twenty-seven thousand
executions between the time of the Communist takeover and the Soviet invasion, with thousands
more killed across the country.54 The Soviet leadership became convinced that Amin was too
extreme, and began considering a military intervention to remove him from power.
Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev and members of the Politburo devised a plan to invade
Afghanistan on December 8th, 1979. KGB agents would remove Amin, making way for Babrak
Karmal, a member of the opposing Parchamist faction, to take over. Nine days after Brezhnev
decided to remove Amin, the KGB attempted to poison him through a compromised cook, but
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ultimately only poisoned members of his family. Upon learning of the KGB’s assassination
attempt, the Soviet military voiced its opposition, saying a formidable military force would be
necessary to back up the plot. Another attempt on Amin’s life was delayed as the Soviet military
and political leaders debated the appropriate size of the invading force. When the chief of the
general staff, Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov was told by Dmitry Ustinov, the Soviet Defense
Minister, to prepare 75,000-80,000 troops for a “temporary” presence in Afghanistan, he
vehemently opposed, saying an army of that size would be far too small to ensure stability in
Afghanistan.55 The plan went ahead anyway.
The Soviet Culminating Point: February 1980
“One country may support another’s cause, but will never take it so seriously as it takes its
own.”
- Carl von Clausewitz56
Aware of the precarious position of the PDPA in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union was a
reluctant invader. When the decision was made, however, the Soviets experienced a set of truly
unique circumstances that allowed them to establish a military presence with little initial
resistance. Prior to the Soviet invasion, a team of 60 Soviet officers spent several weeks in
Afghanistan studying the Afghan army’s capabilities, the country’s terrain, and public support
for the PDPA.57 Kabul’s prior attempts at getting Moscow to send military support gave the
Soviet army the perfect cover to arrive, remove Amin, and firmly establish a foothold in the
country. Under the guise of arriving to help Amin stabilize his country, the Soviet army openly
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entered Afghanistan by land and air. Between December 25th and 27th, it had deployed forces to
secure Afghanistan’s largest roads, cities, and towns.58
Given the expectation that the Soviet army was there to help Amin fight against the
resistance, the short-term Soviet objectives – overthrowing Amin and seizing 13 key parts of
Kabul – were relatively easily achieved. The operation to break into Amin’s palace and execute
him took only 43 minutes, and the Soviets managed to quickly take control of the important
media, political, and military targets across the capital with low casualties. By mid-January, the
bulk of the Soviet 40th Army had entered Afghanistan.59 Due to the swift establishment of the
Soviet military across Afghanistan’s major city centers and the mujahideen’s lack of
organization and resources, February 1980 would mark the culminating point in the Soviet war
in Afghanistan.
81,000 Soviet soldiers would be stationed in Afghanistan by the spring of 1980, but by
then, attacks by resistance fighters were well under way, and costly Soviet operations to gain
territory for the DRA government would soon be planned.60 Prior to the invasion, Amin’s
government had control of only 20% of the country.61 As Rahamim Emanuilov and Andrey
Yashlavsky observed: “The anti-Soviet and anti-government resistance in Afghanistan was very
heterogeneous – it included radical Islamists, monarchists, nationalists, and Maoists. Some of the
mujahideen organizations appeared even before the Saur Revolution; others were formed during
the civil war.”62 Throughout the USSR’s intervention, the Soviets managed to establish some
garrisons in the rural provinces, but were unable to hold meaningful territory outside of the major
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cities and the roads that connected them. A study of some of the 40th Army’s biggest military
operations beyond the February 1980 culminating point supports this view. Since these
operations were hampered by a lack of force mass and concentration – two Clausewitzian
concepts that naturally intertwine with one another – they will be discussed in Chapter 2.

Figure 1: Soviet invasion and territorial control in Afghanistan.63
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Historical Background to the American Culminating Point
After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the war in Afghanistan continued. The communist
regime relied upon Soviet aid to stay afloat, using Soviet food stuffs to feed the people, weapons
to fight the insurgents, and money to purchase the loyalty of influential commanders. The USSR
provided approximately $300 million in aid to the DRA every month after Soviet forces
withdrew.64 The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 resulted in the loss of
Najibullah’s only source of significant support. Boris Yeltsin, the president of the newly
independent Russian Federation, had long argued for an end to Soviet arms supplies to
Afghanistan, going so far as to hold talks with the mujahideen leaders. As a result, aid was
formally cut off on January 1, 1992.65 The civil war in Afghanistan continued.
In March 1992, Najibullah announced he would step down as part of a UN plan to
transfer power to an interim government. Members of his administration, skeptical of the UN
scheme, began to defect to the various insurgent factions. The new government that emerged
after the UN plan failed was a coalition of several insurgent groups, led by Burhanuddin
Rabbani, the leader of the Jamiat-e-Islami party. Almost immediately, factional rivalries led to
fighting inside Kabul. While Masoud – now the defense minister of the Islamic State of
Afghanistan – managed to remove the immediate threats to the fledgling regime, the Rabbani
government was on weak legs from the start. The lack of institutional legitimacy, resources, and
police power set the stage for numerous attempts to overthrow Rabbani not only by the old
Mujahideen factions, but by new ones as well.66
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In 1994, the Taliban formed out of individuals belonging to the Pashtun tribes of southern
and eastern Afghanistan. The Pashtuns collectively made up roughly 40% of the total population,
making them the country’s largest ethnic group. Despite the common background, the Pashtun
people have had internal rivalries rooted in tribal and regional differences dating back centuries.
After years of depraved leadership by warlords and their corrupt soldiers, many Pashtun civilians
initially welcomed the Taliban, seeing them as a group of devoted students (Talib means
“student” in Arabic) that formed an armed religious movement to bring back stability to the
region.67
The Taliban was started by Mohammed Omar. A veteran of the war to overthrow
Najibullah, he became the mullah of Singesar, a small village in Kandahar province. When locals
complained about an abusive commander who kidnapped and assaulted two village girls, Omar
organized a group of armed students to execute the commander and release the victims. This act
of vigilante justice raised Mullah Omar’s profile, and soon his team of young militants began to
challenge the status quo in Kandahar. Seeking to stabilize Afghanistan so it could open lucrative
trade routes to Central Asia, Pakistan was initially a benefactor of the Taliban. It provided the
fledgling group with resources and students from its border madrassas (religious schools). After
seizing an arms dump, the Taliban advanced on Kandahar in November 1994, capturing the
second largest city with few casualties.68
These initial successes spurred a feedback loop that propelled the Taliban onto the
national scene: the more territory and weapons the Taliban captured, the more volunteers joined
the movement, emboldening the leadership to fight more formidable warlords and expand their
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area of control. Within three months of capturing Kandahar, 11 more provinces would be
conquered by the Taliban.69 However, not all of these victories were a result of military prowess.
Some provinces, such as Zabul and Uruzgan, were captured without a fight. The Taliban – which
included plenty of seasoned war veterans among its ranks – sometimes bribed local leaders and
frightened others into immediate surrender.70 These initial sweeping advances gave the Taliban
an aura of invincibility that was not shattered until March 1995, when Mohammed Shah Masoud
and his troops forced the Taliban out of southern Kabul. In the same month, Masoud would
capitalize on the Taliban’s lack of airpower, medical resources, and disorganized structure to
push them out of Shindand province. By May 1995, the Rabbani government regained control of
Kabul and nearby areas as the Taliban’s territory shrunk to eight provinces.71 However, with
support from Pakistan and the enlistment of thousands of new soldiers, the Taliban resurged.
In September 1995, the Taliban regained Shindand and seized Herat, brutally occupying
the western – non-Pashtun – portion of the country for the first time. Kabul, on the contrary,
remained elusive.72 In an attempt to unite against the Taliban, President Rabbani managed to
make peace with two of the regime’s powerful enemies: the Hezb-i-Islami faction, led by
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and General Abdul Rashid Dostum, the leader of Afghanistan’s Uzbek
population. After an unsuccessful 10-month siege of Kabul, the Taliban surprised Masoud and
the other military factions by pivoting to an attack of Jalalabad, which was captured with few
casualties. The offensive spread to three other eastern provinces, and in a matter of weeks, the
Taliban opened an eastern front in the Battle for Kabul.73 The capital was finally captured in
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September 1996. The CIA, who by this time had a limited presence in Afghanistan, had not
expected the collapse of Kabul.74
Fighting in the region continued, but the Taliban managed to take back territory it had
lost along the Salang highway and push Masoud into hiding in the Panjshir Valley. Their next
objective was to focus their military efforts on the northern provinces, the last non-Taliban
stronghold. As of March 1997, the Taliban controlled 22 of Afghanistan’s 31 provinces.75 The
bid to take the North was initially unsuccessful. Taliban attempts to disarm the Hazaras led to a
revolt which precipitated a series of defeats. Dostum, with support from Russia, Uzbekistan and
Iran, maintained control of six northern provinces, while Masoud launched a counterattack and
once again regained the territory around Kabul.76 Thanks in part to a donation of 400 pick-up
trucks from the Saudis and $5 million of logistical aid from Pakistan, the Taliban defeated
Dostum’s forces and wiped out the Hazaras in August 1998.77 Two years after seizing Mazar-eSharif, the last anti-Taliban stronghold of Taloqan was captured, leaving Masoud’s presence in a
small part of the Panjshir Valley as the Taliban’s only territorial rival.78
While the civil war in Afghanistan was fought within the country’s borders, it was not
really an internal conflict. Over 3.8 million Afghans fled to Pakistan and Iran during the war.79
Moreover, Afghanistan’s many neighbors expressed their own national security interests by
propping up the factions that were ethnically and/or ideologically similar to themselves. India,
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Iran, and the former Soviet Central Asian states supported the Rabbani government and the other
anti-Taliban factions. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia aided the Taliban. In India’s case, the support
for the groups opposing the Taliban was largely a result of the country’s intention to foil
Pakistan’s plans. Russia and the Central Asian nations feared the spread of the Taliban’s Islamic
fundamentalism to their own countries. Iran, a Shiite country, opposed the Sunni Taliban. As a
result of its opposition to Iran, Saudi Arabia – alongside Pakistan – wanted to support its Sunni
brethren.80
U.S. involvement in Afghanistan during the mid-1990s was defined by a desire to stop
the arms flow into the country and stabilize the region so lucrative gas pipelines could be
constructed. While the U.S. opposed Iran, it did not aid any faction in the war, and instead called
for negotiations and the shipment of humanitarian aid.81 As Taliban policies towards women and
minorities became more public, however, the United States made its antipathy known. In
November 1997, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said, “'It's very clear why we're opposed
to [the] Taliban. We're opposed to their approach to human rights, to their despicable treatment
of women and children and their lack of respect for human dignity, in a way more reminiscent of
the past than the future.''82
At first, American disgust with the Taliban’s behavior did not translate into military aid
for the anti-Taliban forces. The policy under the Clinton and pre-9/11 Bush administrations was
to provide non-lethal aid to Masoud: night vision goggles, cameras, communications
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equipment.83 U.S. military involvement began in August 1998, when Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda
terrorist network bombed the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The Taliban’s relationship
with Al Qaeda was multifaceted and mutually beneficial. Some Al Qaeda soldiers were
incorporated into the Taliban’s military, and Mullah Omar was recognized by Bin Laden and
other Al Qaeda leaders as Commander of the Faithful (a religious term with deep historical
meanings that signified Omar was the supreme leader of the Taliban).84 In response to the
embassy bombings, the U.S. launched cruise missiles at Osama Bin Laden’s training camps in
northeastern Afghanistan and demanded Bin Laden’s extradition. The Taliban denounced the
missile assault and said they would never give him up, causing a rift not only with the United
States, but also with Saudi Arabia, whom Bin Laden had denounced and threatened for its
relationship with the United States. With Saudi Arabia’s support cut off, Pakistan became the
Taliban’s only ally.85 The September 11th terrorist attacks – perpetrated by Al Qaeda – led to a
more forceful demand for the Taliban to turn over Osama Bin Laden. When they refused, the
U.S. and its allies commenced an invasion of Afghanistan.
The American Culminating Point: December 2001
“The history of military conflict in Afghanistan [has] been one of initial success, followed by long
years of floundering and ultimate failure. We’re not going to repeat that mistake.” - President
George W. Bush, April 17, 2002 86
The U.S. response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks was swift. As soon as Pentagon leadership
knew that Al Qaeda was responsible for the hijackings and the Taliban were harboring members
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of Al Qaeda, the U.S. and its allies decided to invade Afghanistan. The initial invasion utilized
airpower, special forces, and the Northern Alliance to systematically defeat the Taliban, leading
to the American culminating point in December 2001, only three months after the war began.
However, the events of the first three months also featured significant missteps, which provide
clues as to why the culminating point did not lead to complete victory. Clausewitz’s insights on
mass and concentration, and war aims will be used to explain the initial and long-term errors in
Chapters 2 and 3.
From the outset, it appeared that the Pentagon was influenced by the Soviet experience in
Afghanistan. When CIA Director George Tenet informed President George W. Bush of the plan
to topple the Taliban, he noted that U.S. Special Forces would play the role of the insurgents, by
operating covertly in small numbers.87 Likewise, General Tommy Franks, one of the main war
planners and the head of U.S. Central Command, wanted to blend U.S. and Afghan forces to
make the invasion more palatable to the Afghan populace. The bombing campaign, which sought
to eliminate the Taliban’s communications infrastructure and minor air-defense capabilities,
began on October 7, 2001.88
Since Uzbeks and Tajiks were inclined to oppose the Taliban, the land invasion began in
the northern areas where they resided. General Dostum and Atta Mohammed, a Tajik
commander of the Jamiat-e-Islami faction, attacked Taliban forces in the North. Mazar-e-Sharif
and Bamiyan fell in quick succession on November 10 and 11, and Kabul was abandoned with
no fighting on November 13. U.S. and Afghan soldiers then surrounded the city of Kunduz,
engaging the 5,000 Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters for 12 days before taking the city. Kandahar,
the southern stronghold of the Taliban, was captured by U.S. Special Operations Forces and
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members of the Popalzai tribe, led by Hamid Karzai. The fight for Kandahar was more drawn out
than the battles for other provinces, but by December 7th, Mullah Omar and the Taliban
leadership fled, removing any semblance of Taliban control of Afghanistan.89
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Figure 2: Coalition takeover of Afghanistan, 2001.
December 2001 can be considered the culminating point for the U.S. and its coalition
partners for a number of reasons. From a military perspective, the Taliban’s infrastructure had
been destroyed and it marked – prior to the Taliban’s resurgence – a period during which the
Taliban did not control or challenge any of the provinces in Afghanistan. Likewise, it was also
before America’s botched Operation Anaconda in 2002 and the pivot to Iraq in 2003. In this
early phase of the war, the military was focused on removing the Taliban and Al Qaeda threat;
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there was not an expectation that it would become involved in nation-building.91 While plans for
state-development could have built on initial military success – therefore pushing the
culminating point further – this did not occur, and the military operations that occurred after the
culminating point also proved less capable of attaining their objectives. As a result, December
2001 marked the furthest point of defensible extension for the U.S. military.
Clausewitz says there are essentially two kinds of culminating points. One occurs when
an enemy is entirely defeated – a “culminating point of victory,” (emphasis added) – but as
Clausewitz notes, “these are the minority.”92 The majority of culminating points of attack lead
only to the point at which the remaining force is “just enough to maintain a defense.”93 The
inability of the ISAF to maintain control of all provinces in Afghanistan marked an attainment of
the latter type of culminating point in December 2001.
The Counterinsurgent Acceptance Points in the Soviet and American Wars in Afghanistan
Given the analytical benefits of identifying the Soviet and American culminating points,
it would be logical to attempt to locate culminating points for their respective enemies, the
Mujahideen and the Taliban. However, the nature of insurgencies and guerilla warfare tactics
does not lend itself to the concept of culminating points. In Book Seven, Chapter Five (“The
Culminating Point of the Attack”), Clausewitz writes: “Beyond [the culminating point] the scale
turns and the reaction follows with a force that is usually much stronger than that of the original
attack.”94 At face value, this view is not applicable to irregular warfare. In contrast to the clear
military objectives of conventional armies, insurgents seek to raise the enemy’s costs of
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maintaining a military presence through many small-scale attacks over a long period of time.
David Galula attributed this tactic to the asymmetry of the warring forces, observing the
insurgent need to “carry the fight to a different ground where he has a better chance to balance
the physical odds against him.”95 As a result, the uncoordinated, localized nature of guerilla
warfare does not yield the immediate effects that one could evaluate through the lens of a
Clausewitzian culminating point. As Mao Zedong notes: “There is in guerilla warfare no such
thing as a decisive battle; there is nothing comparable to the fixed, passive defense that
characterizes orthodox war.”96 Indeed, this “slow burn” / ”death by a thousand cuts” aspect of
insurgency was identified by Gorbachev himself. In a speech to the 27th Party Congress in 1986,
he called Afghanistan “a bleeding wound.”97
Thus, given the unsuitability of evaluating insurgent warfare with culminating points, an
effectually equivalent substitute is necessary. Pinpointing the moment when the insurgent’s
enemy began to seriously consider a non-military option to ending the conflict provides the most
appropriate antithesis to the culminating points of the Soviet and American military interventions
in Afghanistan, and other analogous conflicts. While considering other aspects of change – such
as shifts in public support, international disapproval, etc. – may be useful complements, they are
difficult to gauge comparatively when one considers the unequal social and political climates of
the Soviet Union and the United States. Furthermore, as this is a study focused on the American
and Soviet militaries, these elements are also beyond the scope of this project.
An identification of the point in each conflict when the counterinsurgent leadership
realized it had to publicly consider a non-military resolution to the war – marking a crucial
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turning point for the insurgents – is a suitable yardstick for evaluating change over time. It is
particularly significant because, from the perspective of the insurgents, it marks the denial of a
purely military victory for the counterinsurgents. In On War, Clausewitz portrayed war as a
“battle of wills” between two enemies. The counterinsurgent acceptance point identifies when
the mujahideen and the Taliban first obtained a significant victory in this figurative battle of
opposing wills.
In both the Soviet and American interventions in Afghanistan, it was the client regime
who publicly announced its willingness to pursue a non-military resolution to the conflict. While
what is crucial to the CAP concept is the underlying action (not whether the client state or
supporting country announces it), it is noteworthy that the local governments were responsible
for the announcements in both cases. This may be understood as a reflection of the role the client
state plays in counterinsurgencies. As the political arm of the intervening superpower, it is
responsible for pivoting to negotiations after assessing the failure of the superpower’s military
means.98
In the Soviet war in Afghanistan, the counterinsurgent acceptance point occurred in
January 1987, when the new president of Afghanistan, Mohammad Najibullah, announced the
National Reconciliation Policy (NRP). The initiative attempted to persuade insurgents to put
down their arms and join the political process. In the U.S. war in Afghanistan, the
counterinsurgent acceptance point occurred in September 2007, when then president Hamid
Karzai publicly announced his intention to enter into peace negotiations with the Taliban for the
first time.
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The Soviet Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point: January 1987
“Is there the likelihood of conditions in other countries reaching the point where the cup of the
popular patience overflows and they take to arms? Yes… The Communists support just wars of
this kind wholeheartedly and without reservations.” - World Marxist Review, 196199
The Soviets considered withdrawing from Afghanistan on numerous occasions.
Documents from the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces suggest that some members of the
military, perhaps wistfully, viewed the Karmal government to be stable enough to allow for a
withdrawal as early as February 1980.100 Brezhnev considered the option in May 1980, and his
successor, Yuri Andropov, did the same in the spring of 1983.101 However, these early
discussions of a withdrawal were not indications of a desire to resolve the conflict by nonmilitary means. Instead, they were attempts at transferring the military burden to the Democratic
Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).
After conducting major operations utilizing only Soviet forces, the Soviets began to have
tandem operations with the DRA army. An objective of the Soviet army was to build up the
DRA forces so that they could battle the insurgents on their own. However, given the desertion
and corruption of the Afghan army, these attempts proved futile.102 As a result, both the Soviet
and Afghan leadership slowly abandoned the hope of resolving the conflict by military means.
The counterinsurgent acceptance point occurred in January 1987, when the new leader of
Afghanistan, Mohammad Najibullah, announced the National Reconciliation Policy (NRP), a
clear attempt to end the war without more fighting.
Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader under whom troops would ultimately withdraw,
voiced the decision to bring the army home soon after coming to power. In October 1985, he told
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the members of the Politburo that a decision needed to be reached on remaining in Afghanistan.
Instead of calling for a withdrawal then, however, Gorbachev approved an 18-month escalation
of the war as a last-ditch effort at attaining control of the country.103 This was the most deadly
period of the war, and only after the escalation failed did the Soviet leadership begin to pursue a
policy of withdrawal and a resolution not defined by the use of force.
The switch to seeking a diplomatic resolution to the war was part of a comprehensive
shift in Soviet foreign policy during the latter half of the 1980s. Dubbed the “New Thinking,” it
was defined by a more conciliatory attitude towards adversaries, denuclearization, and a
retraction of military support for allied nations.104 As Gorbachev would note in a speech at an
international peace conference in 1987, the USSR now recognized the need for “lasting peace,
predictability, and a constructive orientation in international relations.”105 While notes and
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minutes from the Politburo sessions of 1985-1987 reveal increasing acceptance that the military
would not be able to solve the insurgent problem, the announcement of the NRP was the
counterinsurgent acceptance point as it marked the acquiescence of the key decision makers to
seek a non-military solution. As William Maley notes:
National reconciliation’ was radically inconsistent with Marxism, since it emphasised
[sic] nations rather than classes as appropriate bases for solidarity, and cooperation rather than
struggle as an appropriate political strategy. In this sense, it was both an aspect of ‘new
thinking’, and part of the process of ideological dismantling that the Gorbachev era had
inaugurated. It also reflected the failure of military force to solve the regime’s political
problems.106 (emphasis added)
Presented to the PDPA (People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan) Central Committee in
late December 1986 and formally revealed to the Afghan public in January 1987, the NRP was
defined by three main tenets. The first was a six month ceasefire, during which negotiations
between the insurgents and the PDPA could begin. The second and third were contingent on the
pause in hostilities, and they called for the creation of a forum in which all factions would be
represented, as well as the establishment of a coalition government that would be inclusive of the
resistance fighters.107 As Najibullah would admit in an interview 10 months after the
announcement of the NRP, the insurgents refused to lay down their arms, rendering the policy a
failure.108 However, its significance as a turning point remained. Despite the continuation of
insurgent attacks, the Soviet Union – beset with many other domestic and international issues –
no longer saw an exclusively military solution to the conflict, and refused to halt the withdrawal
of its forces.
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The American Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point: September 2007
"America is in the rare position of fighting the same war twice in one generation, from opposite
sides. And it's easier to be the insurgents." - Bruce Riedel109
The U.S. war in Afghanistan has not been a conflict with a clear trajectory. The initial
successes in the first few months suggested the war would be short-lived, but for reasons that
will be considered in subsequent chapters, the tide turned against the coalition forces after
December 2001 and resulted in the counterinsurgent acceptance point in September 2007. By
then, the Taliban insurgency had demoralized Afghanistan’s government, leading the president,
Hamid Karzai, to publicly announce his intention to negotiate with the Taliban for the first
time.110
The Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters who escaped coalition forces in 2001 fled to
Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, as well as the Baluchistan and North-West
Frontier provinces. These secluded areas would serve as a sanctuary, recruitment, and training
center for the Taliban and Al Qaeda.111 In August 2002, nine months after their retreat from
Afghanistan, the Taliban began an insurgency against the Karzai government with a string of
offensives in Kandahar and Khost provinces, among others. Between 2002 and 2007, coalition
and Afghan forces launched multiple operations to push back against the Taliban insurgency.
Perhaps a parallel to Gorbachev’s escalation in 1985-86, the war saw an increase in combat right
before Karzai’s announcement.
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Operation Mountain Thrust, begun in May 2006, was the largest offensive against the
Taliban since the invasion. However, Mountain Thrust – as well as subsequent British operations
in January and March 2007 – were not enough to end the insurgency.112 In fact, it appeared that
the Taliban’s capabilities were only increasing. ISAF commander General David Richards said
2006 was the year exploitation of Afghanistan’s developmental issues “reached a new pitch.”113
Political scientist Seth G. Jones described the uptick in insurgent activity:
By 2006, a full-bodied insurgency had developed in Afghanistan. The overall number of
insurgent-initiated attacks increased by 400% from 2002 to 2006, and the number of deaths
from these attacks increased more than 800% during the same period... The increase in
violence was particularly acute between 2005 and 2006.114
It was in this context that President Karzai announced his intention to hold talks with the
insurgents. The Taliban spokesman Qari Mohammed Yousuf responded by saying, “[The]
Karzai government is a dummy government. It has no authority so why should we waste our
time and effort.”115 It was not unlike the Taliban to categorically refuse to negotiate with their
adversaries. Throughout the Afghan civil war, there were multiple attempts by opposing factions,
countries, and the UN to engage the Taliban in the peace process; none were successful.116
However – barring a complete end to the conflict – the response of the insurgents to the call for
talks is not relevant to the counterinsurgent acceptance point. (In the Soviet case, the majority of
mujahideen also refused Najibullah’s plea to negotiate.)
The significance of the turning point instead lies in the willingness of the
counterinsurgent to publicly state their intentions to compromise with no guarantee the
insurgents will respond in kind. Politically, this opens the door for hardliners to criticize the
112

Ibid., xiv-xvi.
Jalali, Military History of Afghanistan, 510.
114
Jones, Graveyard of Empires, xxiii-xxiv.
115
Ali Achakzai, “Taliban Reject Afghan President's Peace Talk Offer.”
116
Rashid, Taliban, 34-48.
113

35

current leadership and damage their image. To the public, it is a clear sign that the military has
been unable to make substantial progress on their objectives, and does not foresee future
progress. Given these risks, such an announcement has very large implications. While there
would be many other calls for talks in the future (some of which even showed signs of moving
forward) the first attempt in September 2007 signified the counterinsurgent acceptance point and
represented a crucial change in the U.S. war in Afghanistan.
The Significance of the Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point- Depriving the Counterinsurgent of
the Culminating Point of Victory
The CAP can be seen as a crucial milestone for the insurgents in both the Soviet and
American wars in Afghanistan. By depriving the counterinsurgent of a military resolution to the
conflict, the CAP is reflective of Clausewitz’s “battle of wills” concept. This is a key aspect of
his definition of war, and an integral part of Clausewitzian theory as a whole. In Book One,
Chapter 1, Clausewitz defines war as “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will,”
(emphasis added).117 While the insurgent’s ultimate “will” is to force the counterinsurgents to
withdraw and reestablish their control over Afghanistan, compelling the adversary to publicly
announce a willingness to negotiate signifies a departure from the planned counterinsurgent
policy. Initially, both the Soviets and Americans renounced the notion of negotiating with the
insurgents.
"When we speak of destroying the enemy's forces,” wrote Clausewitz, “we must
emphasize that nothing obliges us to limit this idea to physical forces: the moral element must
also be considered."118 During a February 1980 meeting of the Politburo, Yuri Andropov spoke
at length about his recent visit to Afghanistan. He emphasized the USSR’s efforts to unite the

117
118

Clausewitz, On War, 83.
Ibid., 111.
36

Communist Party of Afghanistan and improve both the economic and security situation in the
country.119 The Committee agreed to maintain a troop presence in the country, and Premier
Leonid Brezhnev even stated his willingness to increase the force size.120 Significantly, the
transcript of this early meeting reflected the outlook of the Soviet leadership; They expected to
reconfigure Afghanistan without any negotiations with the mujahideen.
The same outlook could be seen when President George W. Bush laid out his vision for
Afghanistan in a speech at the Virginia Military Institute in April 2002. He spoke of the progress
U.S. armed forces had made in routing the Taliban, as well as the humanitarian efforts underway
to improve the conditions in the country.121 Bush noted that spring would lead to renewed
attempts by the insurgents to retake parts of the country, but said the U.S. army would be
“relentless” in its pursuit of the insurgents.122 “Peace will be achieved by helping Afghanistan
develop its own stable government. Peace will be achieved by helping Afghanistan train and
develop its own national army,” added Bush.123 Missing from his speech – and from the plans of
the U.S. officials responsible for the war in Afghanistan – was any consideration for negotiation
with the insurgents. Since the CAP was the first indication that the expectations of the Soviets
and Americans had changed drastically, it signified a change in the political framework both
counterinsurgents had initially applied to the wars in Afghanistan.
As Chapters 2 and 3 will demonstrate, Clausewitz’s culminating point and my
counterinsurgent acceptance point provide an evaluative framework that standardizes and
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enhances conflict analysis. The four points in time – February 1980, December 2001, January
1987, September 2007 – will be used to analyze the events that led to consequential changes in
both wars.
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Chapter II
Mass & Concentration - The Soviet and American Folly
“As a rule, the negotiators pledge only a small and limited contingent.” - Carl Von Clausewitz124
Introduction
In Book 2, Chapter Two (“On the Theory of War”), Clausewitz explains his view of the
origins and flaws of mainstream war theories and lays out his intentions for writing On War.
While he acknowledges the need for a theoretical underpinning to armed conflict, he is highly
critical of the existing literature, specifically noting its overreliance on the material factors at
play in a conflict, as well as the lack of consideration for the less tangible characteristics that
influence wars.125 In outlining the limitations of narrow, simplistic theories, Clausewitz lists
“numerical superiority” as one factor that is often incorrectly “fitted into a mathematical system
of laws.”126 He claims that this attempt to “reduce the whole secret of the art of war” yields an
“oversimplification” at odds with “the realities of life.”127 However, Clausewitz does not dismiss
force size as a method of evaluating warfare completely. Instead, he offers several nuanced
principles of war that relate to army size in subsequent chapters. Although Clausewitz was
reluctant to provide “rules” for military engagements, he nonetheless wrote qualified instructions
throughout On War.128 The principles that relate to force mass and concentration, discussed
below, provide important insights into the Soviet and American military failures in Afghanistan.
In Book 3, Chapter Eight (“Superiority of Numbers”), Clausewitz describes the effect
army mass can have on war outcomes with his classic dialectical approach. He first argues that if
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all other factors – geography, fighting skill, resources, etc. – are removed from consideration, the
number of soldiers an army possesses “will determine victory.”129 Conversely, given the
multitude of circumstances and elements at play in actual engagements, larger force size could
end up contributing “very little” to military success.130 Clausewitz notes that increases in army
mass can make up for other weaknesses and serve as a “counterbalance to all other contributing
circumstances,” but he does not present this as a principle of war. In some scenarios, he says,
even massive force disparities can prove ineffective. He offers a hypothetical “mountain pass,
where even a tenfold superiority would not be sufficient.”131 For Clausewitz, these geographic
traps are not true military engagements, and thus lie outside of the scope of his analysis.
In regard to military operations, however, Clausewitz clearly advocates for the use of the
largest possible force, concentrated at what he calls the “vital” or “decisive” point.132
Significantly, he does not define what this point is, only commenting that success depends on
“the correct appraisal of this decisive point.”133 This idea is reiterated in Chapter 3 of Book 5
(“Relative Strength”), and Chapter 11 of Book 3 (“Concentration of Forces in Space”), where he
writes that “there is no higher and simpler law of strategy than that of keeping one’s forces
concentrated (emphasis in original).”134 Evaluating the manifestation of conflict as a realist,
however, Clausewitz stresses the variance in outcome and – in Book 1, Chapter 1 (“What is
War?”) – underscores that “the very nature of war impedes the simultaneous concentration of all
forces (emphasis in original).”135Yet, according to Clausewitz, this is a principle that should be
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regarded “as a reliable guide” in military decision making.136 This chapter will analyze the
factors that prevented an appropriate concentration of Soviet and U.S. forces in Afghanistan.
The language in On War suggests that the decisive point was understood by Clausewitz
to be both temporal and geographic. In Chapter 11, Book 3, he writes of the preferred physical
state of the army: “No force should ever be detached from the main body unless the need is
definite and urgent.”137 This idea can also be seen in Chapter 8, Book 3, where Clausewitz
asserts the need for “courage to retain the major part of one’s forces united,” so “relative
superiority is attained at the decisive point.”138 The “calculation of space and time” is “the most
essential factor (emphasis added)” in utilizing mass to achieve military success.139
In this chapter, I will address the following questions:
1. In the wars in Afghanistan, what were the “decisive points” at which
Clausewitzian theory argues for a concentration of the greatest possible mass?
2. Did the respective militaries properly appraise these points? Why were the Soviet
and ISAF forces unable to concentrate mass at the decisive point?
I will argue that – while there have been many “decisive points” throughout both wars in
Afghanistan – the moment at which the tide of war could have been turned against the insurgents
were the culminating points for both conflicts: February 1980 and December 2001. In both
instances, political interference and military miscalculation led to an incorrect appraisal of the
decisive point. Throughout the Soviet and American wars in Afghanistan, military officials,
diplomats, and scholars debated and continue to debate the number of troops necessary to
overwhelm the insurgents. While commenting on a particular force size requires more research
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and specialized knowledge and is outside of the scope of this study, I will argue that
Clausewitzian mass and concentration theory lends support to those who called for a far greater
troop presence in Afghanistan at the outsets of both conflicts.
Furthermore, whereas traditional theorists have undervalued the effect of an insurgent
sanctuary, more recent scholarship has persuasively argued that – while there are many factors
that contribute to the success of insurgencies in Afghanistan – the Pakistan safe haven has been
the key reason for the resilience of the mujahideen during the 1980s and the Taliban today. An
evaluation of the number of insurgents between the culminating point and the counterinsurgent
acceptance point, paired with Clausewitz’s observations on force size, will more clearly delineate
the connection between Pakistan’s support for the insurgents and their success.
The Culminating Point as the Decisive Point for Force Concentration
While Clausewitz never mentioned the congruency between the “decisive point” and the
“culminating point,” it appears they can align with one another. Both points refer to an optimal
moment in which resources and manpower are situated appropriately to provide the best
opportunity for achieving the military objective. As I discussed earlier, Clausewitz described two
different culminating points: one in which the military offensive reaches its farthest point of
defensible extension, and one that leads to outright victory. His descriptions of the “decisive
point” suggest that – if the attacking side was able deploy the appropriate amount of mass and
concentration during an offensive that was culminating – it would lead to a culminating point of
victory.
This is not to say that either the United States or the Soviet Union would have been able
to defeat their adversaries at their respective culminating points had there been more troops at
critical parts of the country. As anyone who is familiar with Clausewitz’s theories would admit,
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military success requires a plethora of factors – including ephemeral ones such as luck and
weather conditions – coalescing to provide the decisive advantage for one side. Likewise, given
the nature of insurgencies, there may be an appearance of stability and peace while an
underground resistance movement reorganizes, recruits, and plans new offensives.
However, because the culminating point occurred in both conflicts as they transitioned
from conventional military operations to counterinsurgencies, it presented the best opportunity to
weaken the oncoming uprising. There were senior officials in both countries who unsuccessfully
advocated for a Clausewitzian force doctrine: Chief of the Soviet General Staff Nikolai Ogarkov,
and Secretary of State Colin Powell. While they adopted different strategic and tactical methods
of waging war, both the Americans and the Soviets increased their force size after the insurgents
escalated the conflict. This is in contrast to Clausewitz’s theory of war, which supports a
formidable, preemptive force concentration that is ready for an escalation of violence.
In the section of this chapter that discusses the Soviet war in Afghanistan, I will show
how U.S. aid to the insurgency, Soviet force size, and the number of mujahideen between 1980
and 1987 illustrate how the culminating point was also the decisive point at which more troops
were necessary. In the section of this chapter that discusses the U.S. war in Afghanistan, I will
explain how U.S. force size and average strength, the increase in insurgent attacks, and the rise in
the number of insurgents support this view as well. While it would have been ideal to select the
same factors to evaluate in both conflicts, the variations in available, reliable information led me
to choose different measurements of Soviet and American military failure. Nonetheless, the
different statistics are all reflective of two, similar doctrines that only committed more forces
after experiencing significant setbacks.
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Soviet Lack of Mass & Concentration
“Massive troop reinforcement...might drastically reduce the insurgency in the next two years.” CIA Assessment, September 14, 1983140
Foreign Aid to the Mujahideen
The day after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, President Carter received a classified
memorandum on the matter from Zbigniew Brzezinski, his National Security Advisor. Under a
section titled “What is to be Done?” Brzezinski wrote: “It is essential that Afghanistani
resistance continues. This means more money as well as arms shipments to the rebels.”141 Prior
to the invasion, Carter had already approved approximately half a million dollars in non-lethal
aid to the anticommunist resistance fighters in Afghanistan.142 The military intervention would
spur a massive aid increase that would last longer than the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. In
1980, $30 million of cash, weapons, and other aid was supplied to the mujahideen.143 By 1987,
the aid amount from the United States had increased to approximately $630 million (see Figure
1).144 Additionally, while the U.S. played the central role in facilitating arms and money transfers
to the mujahideen through Pakistan, China, England, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and others were
financially involved as well.145 The Saudi royal family, encouraged by their own Islamist beliefs
and fearing the Soviets could take their oil fields next, agreed to match U.S. aid to the
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mujahideen dollar-for-dollar, a promise they kept even when U.S. support reached hundreds of
millions of dollars per year.146

Figure 1: U.S. Aid to the Mujahideen, 1980-1987. U.S. aid was matched dollar-for-dollar by
Saudi Arabia, while some wealthy individuals, organizations, and other nations contributed
smaller amounts throughout the conflict.147
While it is true that the USSR could not have known the extent to which the U.S. and
other nations would support the resistance movement, the KGB knew the mujahideen were
receiving foreign assistance long before the Politburo considered intervention. In March 1979 –
nine months before the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan – the Soviet Ambassador to Hungary
told a Hungarian party member that the Afghan insurgents were receiving foreign assistance:
“Recently the Afghan reactionary forces have organized armed actions with foreign support…
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counter-revolutionary reactions have become stronger, [and] are actively supported and helped
by the special services of imperialist powers like China, Pakistan and Iran.”148 After the invasion,
– and due in large part to an extraordinary lobbying effort by Texas Congressman Charlie
Wilson – the CIA launched Operation Cyclone, a clandestine effort that fueled the insurgency
against the Soviets by indirectly providing arms, money, and training to the anticommunist
fighters.
Congressman Wilson’s lobbying campaign would lead to the transfer of Stinger missiles
to the mujahideen in 1986. The Stingers were a surface-to-air missile the resistance fighters had
long sought for their ability to destroy Soviet aircraft.149 While the Soviets may have not
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expected that foreign nations would provide weapons of this sophistication, Soviet intelligence
were aware of the influx of arms that would occur because of foreign support. In fact, they used
this information to threaten an increase in their force presence in Afghanistan. In July 1981, a
KGB agent met with Pakistan’s Chargé d'Affaires and warned him that the Soviet Union would
increase its troop presence if Pakistan continued to arm the insurgents:
In a confidential conversation, he passed on the views of the competent agencies…
Particular emphasis was given to the theme that the US assisted the Afghan rebels with arms
sent through Pakistan; these arms were used not only to kill Afghans but also to kill Soviet
citizens; the USSR would be forced, not to reduce, but instead to increase the scale of its
military assistance… the Soviet side would be unable to stand by idly in the face of such
developments.150
Despite these direct threats, however, the Soviets proved unwilling to substantially
increase their force deployment, thereby debilitating their capabilities as support for the
mujahideen drastically increased. In contrast to the Clausewitzian understanding of mass and
concentration, an evaluation of Soviet force size shows how there were only marginal force
increases which occurred after the insurgents escalated their attacks.
Size of the Armed Forces
The Soviet Union underestimated the number of troops it would take to prop up the
communist regime in Afghanistan. Entering the country with an initial contingent of 50,000, the
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Soviet 40th Army kept the force size at around 80,000-100,000 troops during the years the
insurgency was being bolstered by foreign aid and training.151 Likewise, from 1980-1983, the
USSR maintained a defensive posture around the main cities and roads, actively avoiding direct
confrontation with the mujahideen.152 During this period in the war, the grossly unprepared DRA
Army was expected to handle the insurgents.153 However, as an analysis of major
counterinsurgent Soviet operations will show, Soviet force size was insufficient to defeat the
insurgents even when the 40th army adopted an aggressive counterinsurgent effort and took on
the bulk of the fighting.
Despite attempts to train and equip the Afghan army, it proved incapable of being an
effective fighting force on its own. A CIA Assessment from September 1986 described the DRA
Army as “under-manned, demoralized, faction-ridden, and ill-equipped. [They] remain unable to
undertake large-scale operations on their own.”154 Initially, the Soviet military leadership
expected the DRA Army to fight the mujahideen in the rural areas, while the Soviets guarded the
cities and roads. They quickly realized, however, that the Afghan army was too small and
incapable of making significant progress against the insurgents.155 Due to desertion, the size of
the Afghan Army declined from its pre-revolution level of 110,000 to only 25,000 troops by
1980.156 To bring up the numbers, the Soviets adopted a controversial policy of encircling
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villages and forcibly conscripting young Afghan men. With the exception of the Afghan special
forces – known as KhAD- the Afghan soldiers were generally reluctant to fight the mujahideen,
and often switched sides, their Soviet weapons in tow.157 In 1988, with Soviet forces beginning
to withdraw, the DRA Army had a reported 150,000 troops.158 But Lester Grau and Michael
Gress, editors of the official account of the war written by the Russian General Staff, assert that
Soviet reports of DRA strength were overestimations, since tribal militias would inflate their
numbers to increase the amount of Soviet aid they received.159
An unreliable Afghan army left more of the warfighting burden on the Soviets, who
themselves struggled with deploying enough troops to combat the insurgents. Most antimujahideen operations consisted of only 10,000-15,000 personnel.160 Of the Soviet troops
stationed in Afghanistan, only a portion of them were available for combat operations. “Of the
133 battalions in the 40th Army,” writes Rodric Braithwaite, “only 51 took part regularly in
operations. The rest spent much of their time in their garrisons or escorting convoys.”161 The
battalions that participated in operations were incapable of holding territory they took from the
rebels. One Soviet commander’s lament explained the repercussions of a small force size:
Throughout the whole of that war practically every operation ended in the same way.
Military operations began, soldiers and officers died, Afghan soldiers died, the mujahedin and
the peaceful population died, and when the operation was over our forces would leave, and
everything would return to what it had been before.162
In the numerous Soviet-led operations in Zhawar and the Panjshir Valley, for example,
the Soviets were unable to consolidate their victories in large part because of their inadequate
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force size. While the insurgents would evade head-on firefights and willingly cede territory with
the intention of regaining it after the Soviets withdrew from the region, the inability to leave a
sizable contingent in the area made this tactic easier to implement. Instead of invading the rebelheld territories initially with overwhelming force, the Soviets adopted a policy of escalation, with
each attempt featuring greater troops and weaponry. The Panjshir operations exemplify the flaws
of this approach.
The first Soviet invasion of the Panjshir Valley came four months after the Soviet arrival
in Afghanistan. At this point, the mujahideen were not expecting an invasion of the valley, so the
Soviets did not experience much resistance. They established the Rukha district center, but had
to deploy troops to Rukha three times in the next nine months to defend it against attacks. The
insurgency ultimately proved unmanageable, and a rescue operation evacuated the garrison,
leaving the Panjshir Valley under rebel control.163 In May 1982, the Soviets once again tried to
invade Panjshir in a major, multi-phased operation. They established six garrisons and many
outposts, but as with the first attempt at clearing the territory, the withdrawal of most armed
forces led to increased attacks as the mujahideen returned. In January 1983, the leader of the
Panjshir resistance fighters, Ahmad Shah Masoud, negotiated a one-year ceasefire agreement
with the Soviets. Per the terms of the truce, the Soviets evacuated all but one of their garrisons in
the Valley. The temporary peace allowed Massoud to rebuild his forces and prepare for the next
Soviet offensive, which occurred in April 1984.164
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The 1984 operation to retake the Panjshir Valley involved 200 aircraft, 190 helicopters,
and up to 16,000 Soviet and DRA troops. In the end, the Soviets regained control of five out of
the six previously held main garrisons and once again established outposts throughout the region.
While this was hailed as a great victory for the Soviet Union and the DRA, the mujahideen
continued to attack the garrisons until the Soviet withdrawal.165 Reflecting the situation in many
of the rural provinces, the Soviets incurred high costs with each attempt at seizing control over
the Panjshir Valley, did not achieve any strategic advantages, and had to repeatedly send in
troops to reinforce the forts against rebel attacks, all signs of military operations that went past
the culminating point, and an escalatory policy that could not succeed because of insufficient
force mass.
The ineffectiveness of the seven military operations into the Panjshir Valley was also
illustrated by the growing number of insurgents in the area. Led by “The Lion of the Panjshir”
Ahmad Shah Masood, there were approximately 1,000 resistance fighters in 1980, 5,000 in 1984,
and as many as 13,000 in 1989.166 Evidently, the garrisons and guard posts in enemy territory did
not help to free the area of mujahideen control. The smaller guard posts, called zastavas, dotted
the Afghan landscape, with some located in areas so inaccessible that they were supplied solely
by helicopter. 862 in total, they were manned by approximately 20,000 Soviet soldiers, and were
tasked with being the eyes and ears of the armed forces. While some developed working
relationships with the nearby villages, they were often attacked by the mujahideen.167
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Another example of Soviet military expeditions that failed because of an inability to hold
conquered territory can be found in the multiple operations to seize Zhawar, a mountain canyon
in Khost province, located approximately two and a half miles from the Pakistan border. Seen as
an important base camp and staging area for the insurgents, Zhawar was one of the main targets
for the joint Soviet and DRA offensives of 1985 and 1986.168 The first attempt at seizing Zhawar
was foiled when mujahideen reinforcements overwhelmed the counterinsurgents as they got
close to the base. The second was successful in seizing the base, which consisted of a vast
network of 41 caves that featured a mosque, hospital, hotel, bakery, library, and stockpiles of
arms, ammunition, and mines, but did not lead to permanent control of the territory. Fearing a
counterattack was imminent, the Soviet and Afghan troops held Zhawar for a total of five hours,
during which they unsuccessfully attempted to blow up the caves. The Soviet and DRA casualty
count is unknown, but the insurgents captured 530 men from the 38th commando brigade and
executed all the officers, offering amnesty to the soldiers after two years of labor. Having shot
down 24 helicopters and two jets during the battle, the mujahideen retook Zhawar and nearby
territory.169 Just like the Panjshir offensives, the Soviets were unable to hold any territory or gain
a strategic advantage from temporarily seizing the Zhawar base.
The vast majority of the territory the Soviet army held in February 1980 (the Culminating
Point) was not reclaimed by the mujahideen at any point during the war.170 In contrast to the
villages that were won and lost or destroyed, the major cities occupied during the culminating
point withstood attacks by the insurgents and were passed onto the DRA government during the
Soviet withdrawal. The Soviet operations after February 1980, on the other hand, surpassed the
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culminating point because Soviet and DRA counterinsurgent force size and capabilities were
inadequate for holding territory outside the urban areas.

Figure 2: Soviet Armed Forces Deployed in Afghanistan, 1979-1987. The 1985-1986 troop surge
has been credited by some scholars to Gorbachev, who allegedly gave the Soviet generals one
last chance to solve the problem by military means. There was also a 15,000 force drawdown in
late 1986, followed by a two-stage withdrawal of the entire Soviet army. The last Sovier soldier
departed Afghanistan in 1989.171
Growth of the Insurgency and its Capabilities
The number of insurgents that fought the Soviets between 1980 and 1987 has never been
determined, and estimates vary widely. In reporting the number of mujahideen that were killed
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during combat, the Soviets infamously utilized an unreliable formula that factored in the number
of bullets they expended during battle.172 The Russian General Staff claimed the number of
insurgents tripled between 1983 and 1985.173 Post-war scholarship has placed the number of
mujahideen at anywhere between 35,000 and 250,000 at different points in the conflict.174
However, the historical record indicates that the number of fighters grew substantially over time,
a trend that was predicted by some members of the Soviet leadership, but was ultimately ignored
when the Politburo crafted its military policy.
As international aid increased, thousands of young Afghan men were trained in Pakistan
and Afghanistan. This provided the insurgency with the manpower it needed to challenge the
Soviets with increasing aggression. In 1983, there were two training camps in Pakistan that each
prepared 200 people per month. By 1987, there were seven facilities and approximately 20,000
trainees per year.175 An April 1988 CIA analysis estimated the number of insurgents at
approximately 350,000, noting that only half were “professional” fighters “whose main function
is conducting guerilla operations,” while many others split their time between fighting the
Soviets and engaging in civilian occupations, such as farming.176 Under a section titled,
“Implications for Regime Counterinsurgency,” the report also noted:
Most specialists in counterinsurgency maintain that the government must have a 10-to1 ratio in its favor in order to protect the cities and economic infrastructure and make progress
against insurgents in their base camps. Kabul’s forces almost certainly cannot match guerilla
manpower, which bodes ill for the regime’s counterinsurgency effort.177
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In addition to the growth of foreign aid and the increase in their ranks, the mujahideen
received guidance on their military objectives from Pakistan. Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) –
Pakistan’s chief intelligence agency – used its power to disperse arms to also ensure the
mujahideen were maximizing their capabilities. Mohammad Yousaf, ISI’s head of the Afghan
Bureau from 1983-87 wrote in his memoir: “I had to coordinate attacks on strategic targets and
maintain the initiative over an area of 260,000 square miles… The only way I could influence
the [mujahideen], get them moving in the right direction, was through the allocation and
withholding of supplies and training.”178 This disciplinary approach further enhanced insurgent
capabilities. Had the Soviet leadership adopted the views of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, the Chief
of the General Staff of the USSR from 1977-1984, they would have been better positioned to
address the threat posed by the insurgency in Afghanistan.
Failure to Adopt The Ogarkov Doctrine
Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov rose through the ranks of the Soviet military at an
unprecedented pace and became one of the country’s leading military thinkers. In the 1970s, he
developed “The Grand Strategy,” a plan for overtaking Western Europe without using any
nuclear weapons on the continent.179 He viewed the swift use of conventional forces, paired with
a modernized army and command structure, as the future of armed conflict. Throughout his
career, Ogarkov developed many military exercises that emphasized speed and “intended to
restore the land battlefield as the prime form of warfare.”180 Despite Marshal Ogarkov’s renown,
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he was unable to convince the political leadership of the USSR that the war in Afghanistan
would require far more troops than they were willing to commit.
In two meetings held on December 10th, 1979 – just 15 days before the Soviet invasion –
Marshal Ogarkov voiced his opposition to military intervention. He first objected on the grounds
of the political repercussions invading an Islamic country would have on the region and the
world stage. Yuriy Andropov, with the approval of Brezhnev and other senior Party members,
responded by telling Ogarkov to “stick to military affairs.”181 Later that day, Ogarkov was
ordered to organize a 75-80,000 person troop deployment to Afghanistan. He again objected,
saying that the force was not large enough to fulfill the mission.182 In 1982, he published Always
in Defense of the Motherland, a military operations book that considered the options the Soviet
Union would have in an armed conflict with the United States.183 While he did not directly
address Afghanistan in the text, Ogarkov went against the Soviet status quo in proclaiming the
importance of ground troops by saying that they were “in essence, the basic branch of our Armed
Forces.”184 For him, the future of war with the United States would be defined by a protracted,
regional, non-nuclear military engagement.185 Despite these views, on December 24th, 1979,
Marshal Ogarkov joined the Soviet Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov in signing a directive to
provide “international aid to the friendly Afghan people and also to create favorable conditions
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to interdict possible anti-Afghan actions from neighboring countries,” thereby authorizing the
use of force in Afghanistan.186
The effects of introducing a relatively small contingent of troops for a strictly limited
engagement were felt immediately. After securing the main roads and city centers, the Soviets
were reluctant to commence any operations against the mujahideen, despite pleas from Afghan
President Babrak Karmal. The Soviet military leadership “argued that they did not envision
participation of the units and formations introduced into Afghanistan in combat activities in the
DRA territory. [The troops] could only respond if forced to do so under immediate fire impact on
the rebels, or undertake operations for the liberation of our military advisers.”187 When the
decision to engage the mujahideen throughout the country was made, the Soviets lack of mass
and concentration hampered their ability to combat the insurgents.
U.S. Lack of Mass & Concentration
“The light footprint translated into one of the lowest levels of troops, police, and financial
assistance in any stabilization operation since the end of World War II.” - Seth G. Jones188
In terms of a Clausewitzian understanding of mass and concentration, the U.S. war in
Afghanistan has significant parallels to the Soviet war. Ironically, some of these similarities
came about as a result of attempts by U.S. officials to wage war differently from the Soviets.
Like the USSR, however, the U.S. assessed the need for greater force size too far past the
culminating point. December 2001 was not only the moment at which the Taliban was most
decimated and disorganized, it was also the decisive point at which a concentration of forces
could have prevented the then fledgling insurgency movement from becoming a formidable
adversary. An analysis of troop deployments, violence levels, and estimates of insurgent force
size reveal how the decisive point was missed, and a study of the decisions leading up to the war
in Iraq explains why.
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The Culminating Point as a Decisive Point for Force Concentration
Temporally, the culminating point may have been the decisive point at which America
had the best chance at winning the war in Afghanistan, but a number of missteps related to mass
and concentration caused a widespread insurgency that led to the Counterinsurgent Acceptance
Point in 2007. Geographically, the concentration of U.S. and allied security forces was not near
the south and east, where the Pashtun population that the Taliban arose from resides, or along the
porous border with Pakistan, through which Taliban members could flee, reorganize, and recruit
new members. Instead, the U.S. government was in disagreement over whether any troops
should be sent to assist the interim Afghan government with its security concerns.
During a December 2001 conversation, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and
President Bush’s special envoy to the Northern Alliance James Dobbins discussed the amount of
troops they believed would be necessary to secure Afghanistan’s largest cities. Dobbins believed
only 25,000 would be enough.189 Venturing beyond the cities was not considered, as there was
opposition to expanding the peacekeeping operation outside of Kabul. Secretary of State Colin
Powell supported a larger deployment – a key aspect of the Powell Doctrine – while Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld advocated for the minimalist “light footprint” approach, which was
ultimately implemented.190 The error of not concentrating a sizable troop contingent in
Afghanistan’s problem areas would reveal itself in the months and years after the December
2001 culminating point. In January 2007, just 8 months before President Karzai would announce
his intention to seek peace talks with the Taliban (the Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point), the
senior U.S. military official in Afghanistan Lt. General Karl Eikenberry would call for a larger
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deployment of U.S. troops in response to the Taliban’s resurgence.191 This plea was indicative of
a flawed military policy that escalated its resources only in response to a heightened threat level.
In contrast, Clausewitz’s concept of “decisive force,” – unsuccessfully advocated for by
Secretary of State Colin Powell – called for a larger troop presence at the outset of the conflict.
Force Mass
“By the winter of 2002-3 there was no longer any question that the Taliban had re-formed.” Gilles Dorronsoro192
In November 2001, after the initial combat operations against the Taliban were largely
complete, about 1,000 U.S. troops remained on the ground.193 The “light footprint” model,
adopted in 2002, provided significantly fewer forces than would have been necessary to ensure a
stable Afghanistan. A study of troop levels by the Congressional Research Service (CRS)
detailed the changes in force size from 2001 to 2007. In terms of troops stationed in Afghanistan,
the number of soldiers increased by approximately 10,800 troops from FY2002 to FY2005.194
However, deployments lagged behind increases in the insurgents’ capabilities. The Taliban were
initially emboldened by the lack of a U.S. troop presence in some districts, as requests by the
Karzai administration and the U.N. for force increases were not implemented for months.195 As
Seth G. Jones explained:
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Low troop levels made it extremely difficult to establish law and order throughout the
country. And there was almost no chance to revisit that decision. Once the United States began
planning the war in Iraq, the light foot-print plan was virtually impossible to alter; the United
States could not deploy additional forces to Afghanistan because they were committed
elsewhere...U.S. and NATO forces could clear territory occupied by Taliban or other insurgent
groups but could not hold it.196
In the fall of 2003, the U.S. supported the transfer of ISAF control to NATO, after which
Provincial Reconstruction Teams were formed to coordinate humanitarian relief with the
military’s COIN operations.197 Meanwhile, alongside the insufficient force deployed by the U.S.
and international community, a fledgling Afghan army of 6,000 had been put together. Plagued
with ethnic divisions and desertions, it was unable to assist the U.S. and ISAF forces in their
military objectives.198
In 2006, with the onset of greater insurgent attacks, there was a deployment of
approximately 2,600 additional troops (see Figure 3), and a greater portion were stationed in
combat zones.199 This is indicative of the responsive – not preemptive – nature of U.S. force
deployment that was ultimately unable to make up for the initial strength deficiency. Beyond
soldiers on the ground, the drastic change in the “average strength” – the number of assisting
personnel stationed on Navy ships and in neighboring countries – also illustrates the lack of
force. In FY2002, there were approximately 83,400 personnel taking part in Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF). The following two fiscal years, however, had 74% fewer individuals involved
in the mission. Despite yearly increases to the average strength, by FY2007 the total force was
approximately 31,300, a far cry from the FY2002 amount (see Figure 4).200

196

Jones, Graveyard of Empires, 115.
Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 340-342.
198
Ibid., 337-340. Barnett R. Rubin, Afghanistan From the Cold War Through the War on Terror, (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 423.
199
Amy Belasco, Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential
Issues, (Congressional Research Service, July 2, 2009), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40682.pdf.
200
Ibid.
197

60

It was not until 2009 that the U.S. surged its troop presence in Afghanistan, increasing its
force size from roughly 30,000 to 60,000 troops.201 In an effort by President Obama to finish the
war, peak troop commitment was reached in 2011 with over 100,000 soldiers.202 Conversely,
between 2002 and 2006, while the Taliban – as well as Al Qaeda and its affiliates – were
regrouping, the U.S. underestimated the threat level and focused its troops and resources on the
war in Iraq. Military personnel and assets were diverted to plan and execute the invasion of Iraq
as early as November 2001, even before the Taliban was removed from power in Afghanistan.203
As a result, the peak security presence in the first two years of the war in Afghanistan for every
thousand inhabitants was below U.S. operations in the Balkans, Iraq, and Haiti, among others.204
The demotion of the war in Afghanistan from being a top priority was evident in multiple
facets of Operation Enduring Freedom beyond force size. U.S. financial assistance fell below
pledged amounts, and even declined as the security situation worsened in 2005-6.205 In terms of
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, U.S. forces in Afghanistan received
one or two assets – such as Predator drones or reconnaissance planes – for every four or five that
were sent to Iraq.206 Likewise, Special Operations forces were moved from Afghanistan to Iraq,
and Afghan National Army soldiers had to be trained by National Guard troops, while the
preferred active duty soldiers were sent to Iraq.207 As a result, between the Culminating Point
and the Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point the insurgency was able to grow with significantly
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less obstacles than could have been implemented. The data on insurgent violence in Afghanistan
during this time supports this view.

Figure 4: Average monthly troop levels, U.S. war in Afghanistan, FY 2002-2008. The increase in
force size was responsive to an escalation in insurgent violence.208
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Figure 5: Average monthly troop strength, U.S. war in Afghanistan, FY 2002-2008. Average
strength is a force measurement tool that includes “all military personnel providing theater
support in the region, reflect the time personnel are deployed, and capture those present
throughout the month.”209
The Growth of the Insurgency
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Figure 6: The Growth of the Insurgency. Between the Culminating Point and the
Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point, the number and severity of insurgent attacks increased
significantly. The force response was delayed and insufficient.210
The 2001 Bonn Agreement established the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF). The NATO-led international mission initially consisted of a 5,000 troop contingent
limited to Kabul and nearby areas, but was expanded over time to encompass the whole
country.211 While U.S. forces – which made up the bulk of the ISAF presence in Afghanistan
– were incrementally enlarged, the insurgency grew drastically. Until 2006, the insurgency’s
territorial growth was tracked by the U.S. government at the district level, but the maps have not
been declassified.212 However, the increase in violence that came with the Taliban’s resurgence
was tracked by the media and NGOs. As early as 2002, the Logar and Wardak provinces were
threatened by members of the Taliban.213
Heightened levels of violence demonstrated the need for larger initial force deployment.
Between 2002 and 2005, the number and severity of insurgent attacks more than quadrupled (see
Figure 6). 2006, in particular, witnessed an unprecedented increase in violence as the Taliban
grew in strength and capability. Statistics released by the U.S. military showed a more than
200% increase in bomb attacks and a five-fold increase in suicide attacks.214 On September 8th,
2006, a suicide bomb detonation outside of the U.S. embassy in Kabul left 16 people dead, the
most fatal assault up until that point since the 2001 invasion.215 Overall, 2006 was the deadliest
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year the country experienced since the arrival of U.S. forces.216 Yet, the force size response was
not commensurate with the Taliban’s resurgence. In 2005 and 2006, the U.S. troop presence
grew by only several thousand. By 2008, it was at approximately 30,000, less than a third of the
eventual peak level in 2011 (see Figure 4).217 While U.S. commanders requested more soldiers
and politicians struggled with how to justify sending more troops to the public, the insurgency
continued to grow.
Insurgent Force Size
As with the mujahideen during the Soviet war in Afghanistan, verified and complete
force size estimates are unavailable. Given the nature of insurgency warfare, many combatants
are involved in the war effort part-time. Due to the climate in Afghanistan, insurgents also tend
to launch offensives during the spring and summer months, making yearly calculations
difficult.218 Furthermore, size estimates may not be a good indicator of the strength of an
insurgency on their own. The asymmetric dynamic of guerilla warfare allows for a very small
insurgent force to have a devastating effects on the counterinsurgents. But while it is less
relevant than the number of U.S. troops deployed to Afghanistan, the amount of insurgents
remains a useful gauge of the popularity and capability of the insurgency over time. Despite the
lack of consensus on the Taliban’s size, multiple sources indicate that between 2002 and 2007 –
along with the heightened violence – the number of insurgents grew. While a thorough analysis
of the reasons for this growth is beyond the scope of this study, it is well known that the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which border Afghanistan on the Pakistan side,
became a sanctuary and recruitment area for the Taliban after the U.S. invasion.219 A 2009
intelligence report said the Taliban had grown four-fold.220 A 2008 estimate placed the total
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number of insurgents at 7,000-11,000.221 Their revenues, meanwhile, had expanded with the
opium trade.222 Failure to provide an adequate force size contributed to the prevention of an early
containment of the insurgency, and may have contributed to the Taliban’s resurgence.
The Powell Doctrine
While there are many factors that affect military outcomes, the doctrinal approach that is
initially applied to a war effort is instrumental in laying the groundwork for military success or
failure. The Clausewitzian approach to armed intervention emphasizes a concentrated, decisive
force size. Colin Powell’s intervention framework advocated for this approach, but it was not
adopted. Consisting of a five-pronged analysis that calls for military intervention only if all five
standards are met, Colin Powell derived his force intervention framework from that of his mentor
and boss, former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. In essence, the Powell Doctrine
considered military involvement in a foreign country as justified if it (1) involved a crucial
national interest, (2) all other non-military avenues failed, (3) the planned use of force was
decisive/overwhelming, (4) there was a well defined exit strategy, and (5) the intervention had
international and public support.223 Throughout his lengthy military and diplomatic career,
Powell attempted to apply it to intervention decisions, and only achieved partial success in
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shaping intervention policy. His opposition to limited force deployments was evident in a 1992
Foreign Affairs article on the post-Cold War military policy of the U.S.:
We should always be skeptical when so-called experts suggest that all a particular crisis calls for
is a little surgical bombing or a limited attack. When the "surgery" is over and the desired result
is not obtained, a new set of experts then comes forward with talk of just a little escalation—
more bombs, more men and women, more force. History has not been kind to this approach to
warmaking.224
Clausewitz’s influence on the Powell Doctrine is clearly evident in Powell’s descriptions
of his own views. Asked in a 2001 interview about his support for the use of overwhelming force
in the first Gulf War, Powell appeared to speak of force size and “decisive points” through a
Clausewitzian lens, saying, “I've always talked about decisive force, meaning you go to the point
of decision and that's where you apply decisive force.”225 Likewise, in his 1995 memoir, My
American Journey, Powell acknowledged his application of Clausewitzian theory to Saddam
Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. He opposed the intervention, asking “if it was worth going to war
to liberate Kuwait. It was a Clausewitzian question which I posed so that the military would
know what preparations it might have to make.”226 While he was unable to convince President
George H.W. Bush about first attempting economic means to coerce Saddam, his “decisive
force” policy was implemented; an army of 550,000 soldiers quickly decimated the Iraqi army,
pushing it out of Kuwait.227 The Powell Doctrine’s emphasis on large force size was also evident
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two years earlier, when the Air Force and 20,000 U.S. troops successfully ousted Panamanian
dictator Manuel Noriega.228
Yet, despite the success of the Powell Doctrine, it was not implemented in Afghanistan.
In 2001, Powell was the Secretary of State, a position that put him in the Situation Room
alongside the Commander in Chief for key national security decisions. Furthermore, while he
was best positioned to implement it, Powell was not the only one who advocated for a larger
initial deployment. Richard Haass, Senior diplomat and coordinator of the U.S. policy towards
Afghanistan under President Bush, said he strongly recommended an initial deployment of
20,000-25,000 troops, but his plan was turned down, as President Bush favored the light
footprint approach Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice President Cheney supported.229 While
the problematic aspects of the post-war Afghan government may have occurred independent of
military progress, had Colin Powell’s intervention framework – or a similar plan – been
implemented, the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan likely would have been more successful.
Conclusion
Clausewitz acknowledged the potential political limitations on force size in Book 3,
Chapter Eight (“Superiority of Numbers”), writing that force size would “be decided by the
government...the general who is to command the army in the field usually has to accept the size
of his forces as a given factor. Either he was not consulted in the matter, or circumstances may
have prevented the raising of a sufficiently large force.”230 Likewise, Chapter 11 of Book 3
(“Concentration of Forces in Space”) expresses a similar allusion to political influence on
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military operations: “The effort needed to create military strength...does not always emanate
from the general.”231 In both the Soviet and American wars in Afghanistan, political
considerations repeatedly overruled the views of military leaders.
It is important to acknowledge that an increased force size could have led to negative
consequences that would have hampered the counterinsurgency effort in each conflict. Greater
foreign troop presence might have angered the populace and led to an increase in domestic
support for the Taliban and other insurgent groups.232 Likewise, more soldiers and attempts at
concentrating them at decisive points may not have led to achieving military objectives.
Afghanistan has been plagued with numerous issues – such as governance capability and
corruption, all of which have made pursuing military aims difficult.233 But it is true that, had a
Clausewitzian force model been applied, there would have been a far greater troop presence at
the beginning of the conflict, concentrated in the areas of the country that were most at risk for
insurgent activity. This, in turn, may have resulted in a greater period of time for the Afghan
state to grow without the danger of an insurgency.
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Chapter III
Changing War Aims
“When the decision is made to employ our forces in combat, the committee should ask, [...]
‘Are the political objectives clearly defined and achievable?” - General Jim Mattis, Speaking
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, January 2015234
In On War, Carl Von Clausewitz advocated for a careful parity between political and
military war aims and means, warning that a failure to align the methods with the intended goals
would lead to an inability to accomplish military objectives. Testing this concept with the wars in
Afghanistan reveals its validity and highlights the shortcomings of two superpowers who
incorrectly estimated their war aims and the costs it would take to achieve them. The Soviet and
American experiences in Afghanistan were marred by significant miscalculations of their
objectives both at the outset of each conflict, and as the wars progressed. Significantly, the
mismatching – and at times, lack of clarity – between the methods and aims transpired in
different ways for the Soviets and Americans.
During the crucial early period of the Soviet invasion, the Soviet leadership expected
Soviet troops to play a cursory role in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. As a result, they understated
their military objectives and provided insufficient resources to address the dissension the DRA
government was struggling to eradicate. Conversely, the U.S. initially overstated its objectives
and failed to adequately clarify them for the military and political actors that were tasked with
executing them. In both cases, the historical record reveals multiple attempts to modify the war
aims in an effort to bring the goals closer to feasibility. But as Chapter Two already discussed,

234

General James N. Mattis, “Statement of James N. Mattis Before the Senate Armed Services
Committee,” January 27, 2015, accessed April 18, 2020, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/med
ia/doc/Mattis_01-27-15.pdf.
70

the number of forces deployed and their lack of concentration never matched the needs of each
counterinsurgency.
Clausewitz on Allies Providing Military Support
In Book 8, Chapter 6 (“The Effect of the Political Aim on the Military Objective”),
Clausewitz discusses pacts of mutual support between allies.235 His observations are remarkable
for their insights on the military relations between two states. In particular, Clausewitz pays
attention to the nature of the relationship between a country that sends its troops to assist an ally,
and the country that receives this support. The state that deploys its troops – usually a contingent
of thirty to forty thousand, in Clausewitz’s estimation – in support of another country’s cause,
retains control of its army: “The auxiliary force, usually operates under its own commander; he is
dependent only on his own government.”236 For the assisting state, “the affair is more like a
business deal,” and “even when both [states] share a major interest, action is clogged with
diplomatic reservations.”237 Clausewitz appears to want to present this uneven relationship as a
principle of war, acknowledging that it is “a practice deeply rooted in the frailties and
shortcomings of the human race.”238 Yet it appears that he stops short of doing so because of his
personal experiences.
Having witnessed the rise of Napoleon, Clausewitz came to the conclusion that there
were certain circumstances in which an extreme danger forced nations “to act in a natural
manner” and form strong, genuine alliances.239 Barring such unique developments – comparable
perhaps only to the rise of Hitler during the Second World War – Clausewitz’s perspective on
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troop deployments in allied nations highlights the unwillingness of countries to make their
neighbor’s wars their own. This viewpoint is tied to one of On War’s most central concepts: the
primacy of politics over armed conflict.240 Political motivations are at the core of war aims, since
they provide the meaning and parameters for war. According to Antulio Echevarria, “Clausewitz
demonstrated that, without the overarching influence of purpose, the elements of violence, aim,
and effort have no inherent logical limits.”241 But Clausewitz’s theory of war did not merely
identify the conjunction of war and politics. Throughout On War, he explained how the
alignment of political objectives and the use of force could work to a nation’s benefit, and how
errors along this nexus could lead to military failure.
In Book One, Chapter One (“What is War?”), Clausewitz writes that the political
objectives – or aims – “determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of
effort it requires.”242 While the political aims may determine the amount of effort required to
achieve them, this does not mean that this amount of effort will be applied. Clausewitz cautions
that political objectives in warfare cannot be evaluated absent the interaction of two warring
parties. They must be evaluated through “the influences [political objectives] can exert upon the
forces it is meant to move.”243 According to Christopher Griffin, “Clausewitz argues that the
political goals must necessarily limit the military objectives. His theory goes beyond war as a
continuation of politics to show that politics will in fact limit war.”244 However, a close reading
of Clausewitz suggests that this is how he believed political aims should limit war, as opposed to
what may actually occur.
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In Chapter Three, Book Eight (“Scale of the Military Objective and of the Effort To Be
Made”), Clausewitz makes a seemingly instructive statement about the relationship between
political objectives and the use of force that is of an actualistic nature: “The degree of force that
must be used against the enemy depends on the scale of political demands on either side. These
demands… would show what efforts each must take; but they seldom are fully known.”245 In the
Soviet war in Afghanistan, the political demands of the mujahideen were well known. While the
factions that battled the Soviets and D.R.A. forces followed different strands of Islam and were
often at odds with one another, they all sought to will the Soviets out of Afghanistan and
overthrow the communist regime in Kabul. Likewise, in the U.S. war in Afghanistan, the Taliban
were public about their intentions to seize power from the Karzai government, push the U.S. and
its allies out of Afghanistan, and enforce a strict interpretation of Sharia law. The difficulty in
both wars arose largely with the incongruity and/or unintelligibility of the counterinsurgents'
own war aims.
The instructive nature of Clausewitz’s views on war aims is further seen in the
introductory note Clausewitz added after writing the first draft of On War. While his planned
revision of the text was never completed due to his untimely death, his intention in writing this
addendum was to introduce the guiding principles that would shape his edits. Clausewitz wrote:
War can be of two kinds, in the sense that either the objective is to overthrow the
enemy - to render him politically helpless or militarily impotent, thus forcing him to sign
whatever peace we please; or merely to occupy some of his frontier-districts so that we can
annex them or use them for bargaining at the peace negotiations...the fact that the aims of the
two types are quite different must be clear at all times, and their points of irreconcilability
brought out.246
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Here, Clausewitz lays out a dichotomy of war aims that acknowledges a variance in
military objectives. The examples he provides – complete overthrow of the enemy, or a partial
occupation – set up a spectrum of potential aims, which he mentions in Book One, Chapter One:
“Wars can have all degrees of importance and intensity, ranging from a war of extermination
down to simple armed observation.”247 In Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat,
military historian Colonel Trevor Nevitt Dupuy offers a concise synthesis of Clausewitz’s
conceptual war aims framework:
War can be total, or War can be limited. When the ends of war are total (i.e., the
overthrow of the opponent or survival against such an effort), the means will be violent to the
utmost capability of the contestants. If the ends of war are less than the overthrow of the
enemy, then the means will be less violent.248
Dupuy’s summation could be enhanced by incorporating an additional facet Clausewitz
identifies in the expansive discussion of armed conflict in Book One, Chapter One (“The Diverse
Nature of War”). In this section, Clausewitz asserts that “more powerful and inspiring… motives
for war” lead to a greater emphasis on “the destruction of the enemy,” which leads to a parity
between military and political aims, with the war taking on a more military focus.249 Conversely,
“the less intense the motives, the less will the military’s natural tendency to violence coincide
with political directives… the conflict will seem increasingly political in character.”250 This
additional element provides a complete picture for evaluating the changing war aims of the
belligerents in the Soviet and American wars in Afghanistan (see Figure 1). The rest of this
chapter will identify how Soviet and American war aims did not match the means employed
between their respective culminating points and counterinsurgent acceptance points.
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Figure 1. Clausewitz’s spectrum of war aims. If a war was fought for limited aims, such as
obtaining leverage for peace negotiations, then it should be a more political conflict that utilizes
limited means, such as occupying several provinces to gain an advantage. If a war was fought
for unlimited or very broad aims, such as disarming an enemy or completely breaking their will
to contest one’s power, then the military and political objectives should align entirely, and the
military’s precedence would make the conflict appear markedly less political.251
Soviet War Aims at the Culminating Point
When the Politburo decided to intervene in Afghanistan, they established very limited
war aims, despite being cognizant of the rapidly declining security situation the D.R.A.
government was experiencing throughout the country. While the Soviet military was able to meet
these initial objectives, they were unable to achieve the broader political and military aims that
they were tasked with immediately after the culminating point. The main reason for this was a
gross overestimation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan’s own military capabilities, and
an underestimation of the threat posed by the mujahideen.
The Herat uprising was an indicator that the Soviet Union’s aims – and the means they
planned to use to achieve them – were not reflective of the situation on the ground. Prior to
March 1979 – nine months before the Soviet invasion – the city of Herat was home to many of
the Soviet advisors who assisted the fledgling communist regime in its social, economic, and
political development.252 Geographically distant from Pakistan and the tribal areas that were
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already dissenting from the Taraki government, Herat’s military division (the 17th Infantry) was
considered especially reliable by the Soviet advisors who resided in the city.253 Yet, on March
14, 1979, Herat became the site of the first major anticommunist uprising that resulted in Soviet
casualties.
While what sparked the revolt is unknown, the historical record indicates the uprising
started in the rural outskirts of the city and quickly spread to the urban parts of the province.254
The protestors, chanting anticommunist slogans, attacked the homes of PDPA officials and
Soviets, killing who they could find and setting fire to their homes and the Party buildings.255
The violent rebellion surprised both Moscow and Kabul, but the aspect that was perhaps most
ominous was the treachery of the 17th Infantry Division:
Even in the division, which was considered to be one of the most reliable and loyal to
the PDPA, the influence of the mullahs had proven stronger than the soldiers’ dedication to the
new Afghan regime. After the artillery units fired upon the crowd approaching the military
base, the cannons were turned around and began to fire upon the barracks and the base itself.
Two days later, the detachments of almost the entire division had either sided with the rebels
or simply deserted.256
While the Soviets and DRA troops took back control of the suburbs and main road, they
never reclaimed the old city from the mujahideen.257 Beyond the transformation of Herat from a
stable province to a hotbed of insurgent activity, this initial uprising also articulated all the
elements of future Soviet miscalculation regarding political and military war aims. For one, the
rebellion showed the appeal of the mujahideen’s message to a broad swath of Afghanistan’s
civilians. Likewise, it demonstrated the quickness with which violence could overtake the limited
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force size on the ground. The most foreboding message the Herat uprising sent out, however,
was the unreliability of Afghan government troops, many of whom had a greater allegiance to
their faith than to the PDPA’s political agenda, or were willing to switch sides for their own
safety. By initially sending in a limited contingent of troops to address an unlimited war effort in
which civilians and federal troops were willing to join the insurgents, the Soviet Union failed to
follow Clausewitz’s war aims framework.
The incongruity between Soviet war aims and “the scale of political demands” by the
mujahideen became even more apparent when the Soviet army reached its culminating point in
February 1980.258 At this point in the war, the Soviets had secured the major cities,
communication centers, and roads, but had no plans to pursue the resistance fighters in the
insurgent hotspots across the country. This task was instead given to the badly equipped and
poorly trained DRA forces.259 Beyond the lack of soldiers after numerous desertions, the DRA
army had a deficient training program and struggled with the operation of Soviet weaponry.260
Likewise, the officer class was rife with nepotism and corruption; the possibility of mujahideen
sympathizers across the ranks made the Soviets reluctant to share intel and work closely with
their Afghan counterparts.261 Nevertheless, as Lester Grau and Michael Gress observed, the DRA
forces “were supposed to take on the bulk of the combat.”262
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Beyond the inability of the domestic forces to employ the means necessary to contest the
mujahideen, the Soviet army’s own troops were not prepared for an expansion of the war aims at
the time they were deployed. The first regiments were drawn from the two military districts
nearest to Afghanistan, which had never been tasked with any deployment of this size.263
Furthermore, in an effort to maintain the secrecy of the operation, they were told they were being
mobilized only for training exercises, which resulted in a hastily-created group of units that were
deficient in specialists and were filled mostly with inexperienced, poorly-trained troops.264 After
February 1980, when the Soviet leadership realized it would have to lead the way in conducting
counterinsurgency operations, its own army was not prepared for the endeavor.
Soviet War Aims at the Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point
Up until the Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point in January 1987, the Soviets expanded
their war aims to include directly engaging the insurgents outside of major cities and roads.
While this led to an expansion of means with the increase in force size and the precedence of
military operations throughout the country, it was insufficient to end the insurgency, as the
mujahideen were by then extensively supported by the United States and others. The
counterinsurgent acceptance point marked a return to a more political conflict; the DRA
modified its war aims and began to abandon a strictly military solution to the war by seeking a
political compromise.
Attempts to remove the insurgent threat emanating from Pakistan provide support for
Clausewitz’s war aims concept. After an expansion of the military aims failed, the Soviet Union
pressed for a political solution to the issue. As early as September 1981, Soviet intelligence was
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aware of the uptick in the arms supplies and training the mujahideen were receiving from their
allies, and attempted to appropriately adjust their objectives.265 The following year, General
Victor F. Ermakov was tasked with sealing off Afghanistan’s borders with Pakistan and Iran,
through which flowed the insurgents and arms. Given the extensive length of the border and the
many entry points, this proved impossible.266 Clausewitz’s war aims framework suggests that the
failure of a military solution would result in a switch from primarily military means to more
political ones, which is what occurred.
Throughout the war, stemming the tide of insurgents and supplies from Pakistan was a
key military objective, but the failure of expanded military aims to address the issue meant the
political sphere took precedence, and became a limiting factor on the military goals. During a
1985 meeting of Communist Party officials in General Secretary Gorbachev’s office, Gorbachev
told his colleagues about his attempts to exert diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to end its support
for the insurgency at a recent meeting, saying he “put quite serious pressure on [President of
Pakistan] Zia Ul Haq,” telling him “it is precisely from those camps located inside Pakistan,
from Pakistani territory, that the main war is being waged against those Afghan people friendly
to us, as well as against the limited contingent of Soviet troops.”267 Gorbachev told President Zia
that Pakistan would be threatened by the Soviet Union if they did not cease their support for the
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mujahideen.268 The following year, “the Politburo discussed conducting a 'secret exchange of
ideas' with Pakistan regarding the possibility of expanding the Kabul government by inviting
émigrés to participate. These talks expanded through 1987, and included meetings on the deputyministerial level.”269 While these diplomatic overtures were ultimately unsuccessful, the
prioritization of political means after the failure of military operations supports Clausewitz’s war
aims framework, and indicated the Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point was on the horizon.
Clausewitz’s connection between a decrease in war aims and an increase in the political
nature of the conflict was also apparent in the diplomatic bargaining that defined the later period
of the war. A CPSU memorandum for October 1986 links the drawdown of 15 Soviet regiments
deployed to Afghanistan with “corresponding steps from [the Chinese] who are participating in
an undeclared war against the DRA.”270 By this point in the war, the Soviets were no longer
focused on clearly defined military objectives such as establishing control over areas of insurgent
activity or sealing the border with Pakistan. Instead, they were occupied with political quid pro
quo as they attempted to secure the DRA government – a more limited objective than ending the
insurgency – while planning their withdrawal.
Militarily, the period leading up to the Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point saw an
increase in the number of DRA and DRA-led missions.271 As the 40th army had done when it
first intervened in Afghanistan, the Soviets attempted to play a supportive role in military
operations against the mujahideen after years of training and equipping their Afghan
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counterparts. While the transfer of military objectives to the DRA forces can be seen as an effort
to maintain the same war aims, ceding the objectives to a lesser military force because of the
USSR’s military failure and political stresses amounts to an abandonment of the war aims. As
Artemy Kalinovsky described, “By early 1987 it had started to become clear that the situation in
Afghanistan was worse than Moscow had thought. The economy was ruined, Najib[ullah] was
isolated in the government, and a withdrawal was no closer than it had been in October 1985.”272
The National Reconciliation Policy and transfer of military responsibility to the DRA Army were
the signs of an increasingly limited, political conflict.
Clausewitz’s war aims framework is not only supported by the trajectory of the Soviet
war in Afghanistan, but it also reveals some nuances in the failed Soviet war effort. The Soviets
experienced particular difficulties when they sought to wage a limited war with nearly unlimited
aims. Their attempts at expanding their limited means were insufficient to achieve their
objectives. This led to a lowering of military and political aims. As the political demands were
scaled back, so was the amount of force used, and the war took on a more political nature.
However, this did not mean that the Soviets capitulated to the demands of the insurgents.
Through their financial and arms support of the DRA, they continued to support the war against
the mujahideen after the withdrawal.273
U.S. War Aims at the Culminating Point
In contrast to the Soviet Union’s relatively modest initial war aims, the United States and
its allies announced nearly unlimited political and military objectives upon invading
Afghanistan. The means deployed after the Culminating Point in December 2001, however, were
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too limited to address the aims. Likewise, the political objectives were unclear for those in
charge of implementing them, which contributed to a gradual and uncoordinated retreat from the
unlimited aims. This led up to the Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point in September 2007, which
– as with the Soviets in January 1987 – marked a shift away from a military resolution to a
political agreement.
President George W. Bush’s announcement of the beginning of Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) in October 2001 presented the U.S. military with a unique set of long-term
objectives that it was unprepared for. During the previous decade, the U.S. Department of
Defense had been developing the capabilities of the armed forces specifically to handle two
major theater conflicts simultaneously, as opposed to developing capabilities to address limited
guerilla wars.274 Furthermore, OEF was announced less than a month after the events of 9/11 and
was part of the global War on Terror, a far-reaching and vague endeavor. As David Kassing and
Walter Perry observed, for military leaders at the time, “only cursory attention was given to
planning post-conflict operations. The objective in the 1990s was to push the enemy back into
his own territory, not to depose his government and replace it.”275 Perhaps for these reasons –
and the overwhelming shock of the 9/11 tragedy – the long-term aims set out in October 2001
were broad and unclear.
Furthermore, in contrast to Clausewitz’s war aims framework, the political objectives did
not lend themselves to military aims. President Bush’s address to a joint session of Congress on
September 20th, 2001 laid out the thematic aims of the War on Terror. “Any nation that
continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile
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regime,” he said, promising that the transnational conflict would “not end until every terrorist
group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”276 The objectives laid out by
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in his 2002 report to the President and Congress were
more specific, but were still broad enough to suggest that the conflict in Afghanistan would be an
unlimited war, thereby calling for nearly unlimited means: “The Secretary of Defense outlined
the objectives of the military operations:
(1) To make clear to the Taliban leaders and their supporters that harboring terrorists is
unacceptable and carries a price;
(2) To acquire intelligence to facilitate future operations against al Qaeda and the Taliban
regime that harbors the terrorists;
(3) To develop relationships with groups in Afghanistan that oppose the Taliban regime and
the foreign terrorists that they support;
(4) To make it increasingly difficult for the terrorists to use Afghanistan freely as a base of
operation;
(5) To alter the military balance over time by denying to the Taliban the offensive systems
that hamper the progress of the various opposition forces; and
(6) To provide humanitarian relief to Afghans suffering truly oppressive living conditions
under the Taliban regime.277
For the short-term goals – removing the Taliban from power in Afghanistan – the U.S.
was able to achieve them utilizing limited means. U.S. Special Forces joined members of the
Northern Alliance in attacking Taliban strongholds through a series of offensive operations and
airstrikes.278 But the long-term objectives, which were a mix of political and military goals,
proved to be much more difficult to achieve. The 2002 report alluded to the nation-building
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aspect of the war, adding: “Even after the fall of the Taliban regime, the task in Afghanistan is
far from complete… the United States will help the new government of Afghanistan.”279
The key element of that were lacking – which Clausewitz’s war aims framework implies as a
necessary part of any military endeavor – is the clarity of aims, and the political and military
means to reach them.
The Afghanistan Papers, released in 2019 as part of a Freedom of Information suit by the
Washington Post, shed light on the lack of clear war aims the U.S. military struggled with
immediately after the culminating point. The Papers consisted of numerous private interviews
the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) held with
the officials who oversaw the war effort, as part of the agency’s advisory project entitled
“Lessons Learned.”280 Investigative journalist Craig Whitlock explained:
At the outset...the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan had a clear, stated objective – to
retaliate against al-Qaeda and prevent a repeat of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks. Yet the interviews
show that as the war dragged on, the goals and mission kept changing… Fundamental
disagreements went unresolved. Some U.S. officials wanted to use the war to turn Afghanistan
into a democracy. Others wanted to transform Afghan culture and elevate women’s rights. Still
others wanted to reshape the regional balance of power among Pakistan, India, Iran and
Russia.281
The confusion surrounding the war aims only increased with time. President Obama
adopted a different strategy that featured a troop surge and a tight timeline for withdrawal, but
the war aims were never constructively reassessed.282 In one interview with SIGAR, former
Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns remarked, “After ‘03-04, once we were fully engaged in
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both wars [Iraq and Afghanistan], I can’t remember us ever saying, ‘Should we be there? Are we
being useful? Are we succeeding?”283 An unidentified NATO liaison put it more bluntly in his
interview with a SIGAR official: “It was never fully clear in our own minds what the established
goals and timelines were.”284
Despite the misgivings many government officials had about the lack of direction in the
war in Afghanistan, the lack of clear war aims remained a serious issue between the culminating
point and the Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point. The Powell Doctrine – the most cohesive
alternative to the actual intervention in Afghanistan – may have led to different outcomes. In
addition to the Doctrine’s emphasis on the concentration and use of decisive force – discussed in
Chapter 2 – its other prongs called for concrete political and military objectives and a clearly
defined exit strategy.285 However, due to the back seat role Powell played in the intervention as a
result of Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice President Cheney’s involvement, it was not given serious
consideration.286
U.S. War Aims at the Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point
By September 2007, the war in Afghanistan had intensified to the point that Afghan
President Hamid Karzai announced his intention to seek peace talks with the Taliban.287 At the
time, the United States and its allies had begun to realize that they could not win a war in which
limited means were employed to achieve nearly unlimited aims. While military objectives
remained a major part of the war, the Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point marked a transition to a
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politically oriented conflict in which the U.S. could not seek a resolution to the war that left
Afghanistan without a Taliban presence.
Problems with clear objectives persisted – and may have even intensified – during this
period. As Clausewitz’s war aims framework suggests, the result of unclear aims was a widening
incongruence between political and military goals. In contrast to the first few years of the war,
when Afghanistan was receiving less aid than most other recent humanitarian crises, the amount
of economic and humanitarian assistance dispersed by the United States jumped to over USD$1
billion in 2007 in an effort to shore up the political objectives of the United States.288 Yet, there
were only small troop increases in 2007.289 Evidently, the light footprint approach was not
abandoned until President Obama took office, delaying a troop surge until 2009, a date that some
experts say was too late to be effective.290
The public nature of President Karzai seeking to negotiate with the Taliban leadership
should have been a sign that the conflict was becoming more limited and political in nature, but
the complexity of U.S. war aims and the failure to acknowledge a lack of military progress
prevented this. The result was a significant departure from the trajectory suggested by
Clausewitz’s war aims framework. Despite the failure of military means, political attempts at
conflict resolution were stymied by U.S. and coalition members. When President Karzai called
288
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for negotiations in September 2007, he was opposed by officials in Washington.291 This response
by Afghanistan’s allies mirrored earlier instances in which the Taliban could have been engaged
with diplomatically.
In the international conferences and meetings held between 2001 to 2003 to construct an
Afghan government, the Taliban were left out despite the readiness of some leaders to participate
in the talks.292 Likewise, in January 2007, when President Karzai expressed willingness to “open
the door for talks and negotiations” without mentioning the Taliban by name, NATO Secretary
General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said, “You can’t negotiate with them. I can’t imagine that NATO
would negotiate with people who kill children or teachers in school.”293 As a result, by failing to
shift to political means after the failure of military operations, the U.S. and their allies departed
from Clausewitz’s war aims framework. Considering it was not until 2010 that the U.S.
expressed any willingness to pursue peace talks, this could potentially be responsible for the
extension of the conflict.
Further evidence of this can be found in the many public statements made by senior U.S.
military officials around the time of the Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point. Despite widespread
disillusionment with the war effort, the U.S. and its allies continued to present the
counterinsurgency and state-building efforts as successes. In September 2008, while privately
asking for larger troop deployments to stem the number of insurgent attacks, Major General
Jeffrey Schloesser said, “We’re making some steady progress.”294 By intentionally not allowing
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non-military means to take precedence after multiple military failures to counter the insurgency,
the U.S. prolonged the time it took for both peace negotiations to become a viable option, and for
war aims to be reduced to match the reality on the ground.295 While both of these results
occurred after the Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point, the “holding out” period was not a
strategic effort to better position the U.S. and allies against the Taliban. Instead, it signified a
procedural failure to appropriately assess the progress of military and political objectives, which
Clausewitz’s framework requires.
Conclusion
Both Soviet and American war aims in Afghanistan suffered from incompatibility with
the progress – or lack thereof – that was occuring in each conflict. The Soviets incorrectly
expected the DRA army to handle the insurgency on two occasions: when they first invaded, and
when they committed to withdrawal. As Clausewitz’s war aims framework suggests, their own
efforts at achieving broad military objectives – controlling all parts of the country, sealing the
porous border – proved unsuccessful, leading to the war’s evolution to a more political conflict,
marked by negotiations and diplomatic quid pro quo. Unlike the Soviets, the U.S. did not expect
their Afghan allies to lead the military operations once the insurgency began to spread
throughout the provinces, but they failed – or refused – to recognize when their own COIN
efforts were not making genuine progress. The reluctance to pursue non-military means of
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conflict resolution, and the influx of aid during and after the Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point
may have prolonged the trend suggested by Clausewitz’s war aims framework, and seen in the
Soviet war in Afghanistan.
Beyond allowing us to better understand shifts within the Soviet and American war plans
that may not be apparent without a conceptual framework, the Afghanistan case studies support a
different perspective on Clausewitz’s major contribution to the study of war: the view that armed
conflict is a continuation of policy by other means. The wars in Afghanistan show the
bidirectional nature of his observation. War is an extension of politics, but when war does not go
in one’s favor, a return to politics is – or should be – attempted. While this concept may appear
simple, in the U.S. war the denial and concealment of military failure prevented the pursuit of
negotiations at the CAP, which likely contributed to the prolongation of the conflict.
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Conclusion
“Guerilla war does not fit into the popular image of high-tech future war, but it may well be the
future war that a high-tech country finds itself fighting.” - Brigadier General Theodore C.
Mataxis296
Summary of Findings
By viewing the concepts in On War in connection to modern conflicts, we can see
contemporary expressions of timeless principles about warfare and international relations.
Seeking to connect current scholarship about Afghanistan and other insurgencies to Clausewitz
can bolster more recent analyses that offer explanations for these conflicts. There is a lot of
research that investigates the cultural, political, and military problems that have plagued
Afghanistan for decades, but as Clausewitz said himself, “Whoever relies purely on the
perspectives of his own times is inclined to treat what is most recent as best.”297 This study
sought to bridge the gap between today’s research and classical military theory. Since On War is
an unfinished text, extracting its conceptual frameworks required an intensive study of its many
parts and the interpretations of experts on Clausewitz’s life and views. The three aspects of
Clausewitz’s theory of war that were tested in this study revealed where the Soviets and
Americans erred, and also where contemporary war outstripped Clausewitzian theory of its use.
In Chapter 1, I identified the potential culminating point – defined as the furthest point of
defensible extension within a campaign or an entire war – for the Soviet and American forces in
Afghanistan. I concluded that the armies were militarily best situated in February 1980 and
December 2001, respectively. These dates marked when prospects for both counterinsurgents
were at their peak, but they also signified when the insurgency became a viable threat and
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unsuccessful COIN operations commenced. Since culminating points are not applicable to
insurgent warfare, I presented an effectual equivalent called the Counterinsurgent Acceptance
Point (CAP), defined as the point in time when the counterinsurgent first publicly announces a
willingness to negotiate with the insurgent faction. Since the CAP signifies an important
departure from the initial objectives to defeat the insurgency militarily, it represents the denial of
the counterinsurgents’ will by the insurgents. I concluded that January 1987 and September 2007
were the CAPs for the Soviets and Americans, respectively. Taken together, these four dates
allow for a standardized model for comparative analysis that identifies when the U.S. and Soviet
Union were similarly positioned in Afghanistan.
In Chapter 2, I evaluated Clausewitz’s view that invading forces require overwhelming
mass and concentration at a “decisive point” to have the best chance at defeating their enemies. I
argued that this view applied to Afghanistan. Both culminating points represented the decisive
point opportunity, and both counterinsurgents failed to deploy enough troops at this time against
the opinions of Grand Marshal Ogarkov and General Colin Powell, the leading military officials.
Instead, troops were kept in the most stable parts of the country, and brief forays into rebel
territory did not lead to the collapse of the insurgency, as the resistance fighters would return to
the area upon the departure of the counterinsurgents. Analysis of troop deployments and
associated factors between the culminating point and the CAP revealed how both superpowers
escalated the conflict only after the insurgencies became larger, better trained, and well funded.
In Chapter 3, I considered the decisions made by the U.S. and USSR in the context of
Clausewitz’s instructive war aims framework, which called for a strict parity between means and
military and political objectives. The spectral framework also suggested an increase in the
political nature of a conflict as the aims and means became more limited. Paul Schuurman’s
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articulation of the war aims framework summarizes the intended flow of conflict, as detailed in
On War: “Politics is the context for a series of escalating and de-escalating mechanisms that can
drive the intensity of war upward and downward.”298 I concluded that the Soviet Union initially
underestimated the military aims when they invaded in December 1979, only to later revise their
objectives while keeping the number of troops committed below the necessary amount. In
contrast, the U.S. initially overstated their objectives while also devoting insufficient resources.
Furthermore, whereas the Soviet Union began to negotiate soon after the CAP, the United States
withheld its support for negotiations after the political arm of the counterinsurgency, the local
government, announced it was willing to hold talks with the Taliban.
Clausewitz was correct in his descriptions of inter-state military relations. For both the
Soviet and American leadership, the war in Afghanistan did not transcend into the rare type of
conflict that would cause one state to wholly adopt another’s cause as its own. Ultimately, the
Soviets knew that while there would be negative consequences for the spread of communist
ideology, the instability and even downfall of a neighboring communist regime would not
threaten their own sovereignty. The U.S., along with its international coalition of allies, remains
concerned for the stability of the Afghan state, but has wavered on the amount of aid and length
of time it is willing to commit to the troubled regime. In these contemporary conflicts, it appears
that the term “asymmetry” has defined not only the type of warfare that is seen on the ground,
but also the differences between the motivations of intervening powers and client states.
Beyond Clausewitz
This study sought to compare the Soviet and American wars in Afghanistan in order to
evaluate Clausewitz’s applicability to contemporary conflicts and better understand both wars.
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False equivalencies and parallels often plague events that bear regional or contextual similarities
to one another. Seeking to avoid overstatement of the congruence between both wars, the
parallels and divergences of how the Soviets and Americans waged war in Afghanistan were
emphasized only when the historical record profoundly indicated them.
The findings suggest that a more sober initial assessment of the force size necessary to
handle a conflict with the potential of becoming an insurgency could have led to different
outcomes for the Soviets and Americans. Or, it could have led to the adoption of more limited
war aims. Ultimately, the policy of responsive (as opposed to preemptive) escalation – indicated
by the aid and force size increases that occurred after the growth of the insurgency – put both
superpowers behind the insurgent’s operating curve. However, an adherence to Clausewitz’s
theories was not out of reach for either the Soviet or American leadership. In both instances,
military generals strongly advocated against small footprint models and escalatory strategies.
The disregard given to Generals Colin Powell and Nikolai Ogarkov is perhaps indicative of a
larger lack of attention paid to the informed opinions of military leaders when it is not politically
expedient.299 While what is known about Ogarkov’s views is less detailed than Powell’s, at their
core both plans shared an adherence to a Clausewitzian model of force size.
Additionally, both nations had prior experiences with rapid interventions that achieved
their military objectives. While the First Gulf War was an immense military success that
included the use of a decisive force, the best example for military intervention that led to regime
change was the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989. The effort was led by then Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs Colin Powell, who utilized decisive force by sending in the Air Force and 20,000
U.S. troops to overthrow Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega and install a new government.300
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For the Soviet Union, their prior experience was the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.
Technically a Warsaw Pact intervention, the largely Soviet force presence consisted of
approximately 250,000 troops that successfully quelled a civilian uprising.301 Granted, both the
Panama and Czechoslovakia interventions had significant differences from the Afghanistan
insurgencies, such as the absence of a sanctuary and support foreign support. However, some of
the same Soviet and American leaders who would endorse – or acquiesce to – light footprint
approaches in Afghanistan accepted the need for relatively larger force sizes in these conflicts.
Afghanistan, therefore, represented a departure from military policies that were
previously successful. While a thorough investigation of the reasons for this is outside of my
project’s scope, a preliminary appraisal suggests two other wars heavily influenced the decision
making that led to insufficient Soviet and American force presence in Afghanistan. The USSR’s
thinking was guided by the U.S. experience during the Vietnam War:
By restricting the size of its occupying forces, Moscow attempted to escape
entanglement of the kind which had led Americans to commit more than half a million men in
Vietnam...The Soviet contingent...was unable to compensate for the weakness of the Afghan
army, especially since the Soviet troops, who had little taste for combat as well as being illequipped and underfed, were restricted to ‘useful’ Afghanistan: the cities and main axes of
communication.302
The erroneous view that large force size was the reason for military failure in Vietnam may have
also influenced the Bush administration’s policy towards Afghanistan, but the main factor in
Afghanistan’s light footprint approach appears to have been the Administration’s intention to
invade Iraq:
Even before the United States attacked Bin Laden at Tora Bora, the U.S. government
began downsizing its commitment of resources to Afghanistan. While U.S. policymakers had
been hesitant to provide assistance to Afghanistan from the beginning, the U.S. invasion of Iraq
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ensured that Afghanistan would take a backseat in money, policy attention, and military and
nonmilitary aid.303
The repercussions of not prioritizing Afghanistan in the first years of the war are still being felt
today. In both conflicts, the failure of later escalations in troops and resources indicate that
“catching up” is a difficult endeavor. As a military policy, it should be avoided.
The many offensive counterinsurgent operations in Afghanistan have also revealed the
ineffectiveness of seizing territory without the requisite number of troops to hold it. From the
Soviets numerous invasions of the Panjshir Valley and Zhawar to NATO’s Operation Mountain
Thrust, tactical successes often failed to translate into long-term victories because troops were
withdrawn. While Clausewitz could not have offered such insurgency-specific advice in On War,
the experiences of numerous commanders in Afghanistan indicate that any temporary occupation
of land is merely a Pyrrhic victory.
Limitations
Clausewitz did not write On War with the intention of creating a field manual, but he did
want it to be an instructive guide for military and political leaders.304 As Roger Ashley Leonard
observed: “Shortly before his death, [Clausewitz] pointed out that he held at least the ‘ruling
principles’ (Hauptlineamente) of his work to be true; in fact to be universally and internally true,
since they were possessed of an ‘inherent necessity.’”305 This study and many others affirm the
validity of some of his concepts, but the centuries since On War was published have seen
developments that Clausewitz did not envision. The evolution of armed conflict has inevitably
produced some limitations to his theory of war.
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The debut of weapons of mass destruction in the 20th century took warfare into what
Clausewitz would have only viewed as the theoretical realm. Nuclear weapons, for example,
provide the kind of wholesale destruction that Clausewitz considered only possible in the
abstract and philosophical “absolute war,” where no sphere of society was safe from
annihilation.306 While no nuclear weapons have ever been used in Afghanistan, the nature of
insurgent warfare – paired with modern weaponry – has led to massive humanitarian crises in
which civilians and their livelihoods have become both purposeful and incidental targets of war.
Contemporary war has also seen an expansion of the use of humanitarian aid and statebuilding support in conjunction with military operations. On War suggests that Clausewitz had a
more limited view of the support that one state can provide another. Both the Soviets and
Americans invested heavily in developing Afghanistan’s infrastructure and civil society. This
was done alongside active military operations as part of a grand – if vague and unmanageable –
plan to shape the country in its image. Understandably a reflection of his time, Clausewitz’s
writings on armed conflict do not address the military implications of humanitarian support and
institutional development. Perhaps most significantly, the dual-role of soldier and aid distributor
played by modern armies does not factor into Clausewitz’s theory of war.
Yet, despite the historical constraints that are evident in a modern analysis of On War, it
appears that Clausewitz may have foreseen a future in which irregular war would be more
prevalent: In Book Six, Chapter 26 (“The People in Arms”), he wrote that guerilla warfare was
“not as yet very common.”307 This prescient allusion to a future defined by unconventional
conflicts is one of the many intriguing comments that one can find in Clausewitz’s writings. It
serves as a reminder to the reader that he knew there would be changes in the future his theories
306
307

Schuurman, “Clausewitz on Real War,” 378.
Clausewitz, On War, 583.
96

could not account for. This study showed the benefit of identifying culminating points in
evaluating the success of counterinsurgents, but the nature of irregular conflict made them
inapplicable to insurgents. My concept of a Counterinsurgent’s Acceptance Point, however, built
on Clausewitz’s attempts at identifying critical junctures in wars. By complementing culminating
points, CAP is an expansion of Clausewitzian analysis that identifies a key moment
counterinsurgents have often experienced.
Areas for Further Research
“Everything then depends on discovering the culminating point by the fine tact of
judgment.,” wrote Clausewitz.308 While he probably meant this in regard to the military
tacticians who lead armies, it applies to scholars who consider wars after they have occurred as
well. Culminating points and Counterinsurgent Acceptance Points could be identified in other
contemporary conflicts, such as the wars in Iraq and Syria, providing a standardized model for
comparative conflict analysis. One potential area of research is a quantitative evaluation of when
culminating and Counterinsurgent Acceptance Points occur in order to assess if there are any
trends or patterns. In the case studies that were the focus of this project, the culminating points
occurred 2-3 months after the initial invasion. The CAP occurred 6 years and 11 months after the
culminating point for the Soviet Union, and 5 years and 9 months after the culminating point for
the United States. The creation of a database with culminating points and CAPs for other wars
would allow scholars to investigate whether there is statistical significance in the temporal
location of either point.
Another area for further research concerns the adoption or dismissal of the opinions given
by senior military officials regarding armed interventions into other states. Both wars in
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Afghanistan saw the implementation of strategies at odds with the advice of four-star generals.
Are these anomalies? Or are they commonplace occurrences that can lead to tragic
consequences? Further research into intervention deliberations is required.
Carl von Clausewitz’s enduring legacy is a result of the ideas contained in On War. This
study explored only a small portion of the dynamic and compelling theories found in the book.
The text remains a valuable source of military theory that should continue to be studied by
scholars and policymakers alike. The knowledge contained therein offers everyone an
opportunity to evaluate the armed conflicts of the past, and be prepared for the ones of the future.

98

Bibliography
Achakzai, Saeed Ali. “Taliban Reject Afghan President's Peace Talk Offer.” Reuters, September
30, 2007. Accessed April 16, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghan-talksidUSISL26 606720070930.
Acharya, Arabinda, Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, and Sadia Sulaiman. “Making Money in the
Mayhem: Funding Taliban Insurrection in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan.” Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism 32, no.2, (2009): 95-108, DOI: 10.1080/10576100802628314.
“The Afghan Taliban.” Center for International Security and Cooperation. Accessed April 16,
2020. https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/afghantaliban#highlight_text_858 1.
Al Jazeera. “Timeline: U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan 2001 to 2017.” Al Jazeera, August 22,
2017. Accessed April 16, 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/2001-2017interventio n-afghanistan-70822035036797.html.
Almukhtar, Sarah and Rod Nordland. “What Did the U.S. Get for $2 Trillion in Afghanistan?”
New York Times, September 9, 2019. Accessed April 19, 2020.
https://www.nytimes.com/interact ive/2019/12/09/world/middleeast/afghanistan-warcost.html?searchResultPosition=1&mtrref=.
Annen, Niels. “Echoes of the Soviet Surge.” Foreign Policy. March 2, 2011.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/03/02/echoes-of-th e-soviet-surge/.
Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Meeting of the CC CPSU Politburo February 7th, 1980 (excerpt). National Security Archive.
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/ NSAEBB396/doc s/1980-0207%20Politburo%20Session %20on%20Affghanistan.PDF.
Baker, Peter. “Additional Troop Increase Approved.” Washington Post, March 11, 2007.
Accessed April 19, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/03/10/A R2007031001397.html.
Bearak, Barry. “Mohammed Zahir Shah, Last Afghan King, Dies at 92.” New York Times, July
24, 2007. https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/24/world/asia/24shah.html?auth=loginemail.
Beckett, Ian. “The Historiography of Insurgency.” In The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency
and Counterinsurgency, Florence: Routledge, 2012.
Belasco, Amy. Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other
Potential Issues. Congressional Research Service, July 2, 2009.
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R4 0682.pdf.

99

Bodansky, Yossef. “Ogarkov Tells How Soviets Can Win War in Europe.” Washington Times,
July 23, 1985. Accessed April 18, 2020.
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RD P90-00965R0001005800038.pdf.
Braithwaite, Rodric. Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979-1989. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2011.
Bush, George W. “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People.” Speech,
Washington D.C., U.S. Capitol, September 20, 2001. Accessed April 19, 2020.
https://georgewbu sh-white house.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.
Bush, George W. “Remarks by the President to the George C. Marshall ROTC Award Seminar
on National Security.” Speech, Virginia Military Institute, April 17, 2002. Accessed April
19, 2020. https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020417-1.html.
Byrne, Jim. “Keegan Versus Von Clausewitz.” clausewitz.com, April 24, 1999.
http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Keegan/ByrneArt.htm.
Central Intelligence Agency. “Afghanistan: The Insurgency This Summer.” September 8, 1986.
Accessed April 18, 2020. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIARDP91B00874R00 0100250014-0.pdf.
Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Intelligence. “Afghanistan: Status and Prospects of
the Insurgency.” September 14, 1983. Accessed April 18, 2020.
https://www.cia.gov/library/readi ngroom/docs/CIA-RDP85M00364R002404760 0660.pdf.
Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian
Analysis, “Afghanistan: Insurgent Manpower,” May 1988, accessed April 18, 2020,
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP06T00412R0007079600011.pdf.
Clarke, Colin. Terrorism, Inc.: The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Irregular Warfare.
Praeger Security International, 2015.
Clausewitz, Carl von. Clausewitz on Small War. Edited by Christopher Daase and James W.
Davis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
Clausewitz, Carl Von. On War. Translated and edited by Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret.
New York: Princeton University Press, 1976.
Coll, Steve. Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
2001-2016. London: Penguin Books, 2019.

100

Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the
Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. New York: Penguin Press, 2005.
"Conference of Secretaries of the CC CPSU, Held in the Office of CC CPSU General Secretary
Comrade M. S. Gorbachev." March 15, 1985. Accessed April 19, 2020. History and
Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division,
Dmitriĭ Antonovich Volkogonov papers, 1887-1995, mm97083838, Reel 17, Container
25. Accessed April 19, 2020. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121966.
"CPSU Memorandum." October 24, 1986. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive.
Stiftung Archiv der Parteien- und Massenorganisationen im Bundesarchiv, Berlin,
DY30/2383, 122. Accessed April 19, 2020. Translated by David Wolff.
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/ document/117270.
Crile, George. Charlie Wilson’s War: The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation
in History. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003.
"Directive Nº 312/12/001 of 24 December 1979 signed by Ustinov and Ogarkov." December 24,
1979. Accessed April 18, 2020. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive.
Translated by Gary Goldberg. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111784.
Dorronsoro, Giles. Revolution Unending- Afghanistan: 1979 to the Present. Translated by John
King. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005.
Dupuy, T.N. Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat, UK: Leo Cooper, 1992.
Echevarria II, Antulio, J. Clausewitz and Contemporary War. UK: Oxford University Press,
2007.
Echevarria II, Antulio, J. "'Reining in' the Center of Gravity Concept." Air & Space Power
Journal, (Summer 2003). Gale Onefile.
Elias, Mohammad Osman Tariq. “The Resurgence of the Taliban in Kabul - Logar and Wardak.”
In Decoding the New Taliban: Insights From the Afghan Field, edited by Antonio
Giustozzi, 43-55. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.
Emanuilov, Rahamim. Terror in the Name of Faith: Religion and Political Violence. Boston,
MA: Academic Studies Press, 2011.
Erlanger, Steven. “In Afghan Refugee Camp, Albright Hammers Taliban.” New York Times,
November 19, 1997. https://www.nytimes.com/1997/11/19/world/in-afghan-refugeecamp-albrig ht-hammers-taliban.html.
Fenzel, Michael R. No Miracles: The Failure of Soviet Decision-Making in the Afghan War.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017.

101

Fitzgerald, Mary C. “Marshal Ogarkov on the Modern Theater Operation.” Conflict Quarterly.
Summer 1986: 39-58.
Fleming, Bruce. “Can Reading Clausewitz Save Us From Future Mistakes?” Parameters 34,
(Spring 2004).
Fleming, Colin M. Clausewitz’s Timeless Trinity: A Framework for Modern War. UK: Ashgate,
2014.
Franco, Claudio. “The Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan.” In Decoding the New Taliban: Insights From
the Afghan Field, edited by Antonio Giustozzi, 269-291. New York: Columbia University
Press, 2009.
Fry, Tony. Unstaging War, Confronting Conflict and Peace. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2019.
Galula, David. Counter-Insurgent Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security
International, 2006.
Garrity, Patrick J. “The Parameters of Victory.” Claremont Review of Books, August 15, 2012.
https://claremontreviewofbooks.com/digital/the-parameters-of-victory/.
Gates, Robert M. From the Shadows. Simon & Schuster: New York, 1996.
Giustozzi, Antonio, Martin Ewans, Peter Marsden and Shanthie Mariet D’Souza, “HistoryAfghanistan,” Europa World Online. London: Routledge. Accessed 27 February 2020.
http://www.europaworld.com/entry/af.hi.
Gorbachev, Mikhail. Memoirs. Doubleday: New York, 1996.
Gray, Andrew. “Taliban Step Up Cross-Border Attacks- U.S. Military.” Reuters, January 21,
2007. Accessed April 16, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSISL240273.
Greentree, Todd. “Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: U.S. Performance and the Institutional
Dimension of Strategy in Afghanistan.” Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no.3 (2013):
325-356. Accessed April 19, 2020. DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2013.764518.
Griffith, Christopher. “From Limited War to Limited Victory: Clausewitz and Allied Strategy in
Afghanistan.” Contemporary Security Policy 35, no.3 (2014): 446-467.
Guha, Manabrata. Reimagining War in the 21st Century: From Clausewitz to Network-Centric
Warfare. Routledge: Abingdon, 2011.

102

Honig, Jan Willem. “Clausewitz’s On War: Problems of Text and Translation.” In Clausewitz in
the Twenty-First Century. Edited by Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe. Oxford:
Oxford UP, 2007.
Jalali, Ali Ahmad. A Military History of Afghanistan: From the Great Game to the Global War
on Terror. Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2017.
Jones, Seth G. Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan. New York: W.W. Norton,
2010.
Jones, Seth G. "The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad." International
Security 32, no. 4 (2008): 7-40. Accessed April 17, 2020.
www.jstor.org/stable/30129790.
Kalinovsky, Artemy. “Old Politics, New Diplomacy: The Geneva Accords and the Soviet
Withdrawal from Afghanistan.” Cold War History 8, no. 3 (2008): 381-404. Accessed
April 19, 2020. DOI: 10.1080/14682740802222213.
Keegan, John. “What is War?” In A History of Warfare. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993.
"KGB Active Measures in Southwest Asia in 1980-82." April 2004. Accessed April 18, 2020.
History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive.
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/docu ment/110013.
Kronenfeld, Daniel A. “Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Not All Refugees, Not Always in
Pakistan, Not Necessarily Afghan?” Journal of Refugee Studies 21, no.1 (March 2008):
43–63. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fem048.
Kurtzleben, Danielle. “Chart: How U.S. Troop Levels in Afghanistan Have Changed Under
Obama.” National Public Radio, July 6, 2016. Accessed April 16, 2020,
https://www.npr.org/201 6/07/06/484979294/chart-how-the-u-s-troop-levels-inafghanistan-have-changed under-obama.
Landay, Jonathan S. and Saeed Shah. “9/11 7 Years Later, U.S. ‘Safe,’ South Asia in Turmoil.”
McClatchy Newspapers. September 10, 2008. Accessed April 16, 2020.
https://www.mcclatchyd c.com/news/politics-government/article24499744.html.
LaFeber, Walter. "The Rise and Fall of Colin Powell and the Powell Doctrine." Political Science
Quarterly 124, no. 1 (2009): 71-93. Accessed April 17, 2020.
www.jstor.org/stable/25655610.
Lyakhovsky, Alexander. “On the Changing Mission of the Soviet Forces in Afghanistan.”
Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya. Moscow, Russia: Nord, 2004, The National Security
Archive. Document 14. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/r14.pdf.

103

Lyakhovsky, Alexander. Трагедия и Доблесть Афгана [Tragedy and Valor of the Afghan]
Moscow: Iskona, 1995.
Macaskill, Ewen and Simon Tisdall. “White House shifts Afghan Strategy Towards Talks With
Taliban.” The Guardian, July 19, 2010. Accessed April 20, 2020.
https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2010/jul/19/obama-afghanistan-strategy-talibannegotiate.
Maley, William. The Afghanistan Wars. New York: Palgrave, 2002.
“Map of Foreign Assistance: Afghanistan.” Accessed April 19, 2020. https://www.foreignassista
nce.gov/explore.
Matthews, Matt M. We Have Not Learned How to Wage War There: The Soviet Approach in
Afghanistan, 1979-1989. Kansas: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center Combat Studies
Institute Press, 2011.
Mattis, James N. “Statement of James N. Mattis Before the Senate Armed Services Committee.”
January 27, 2015. Accessed April 18, 2020. https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/Mattis_01-27-15.pdf.
McCauley, Martin. Afghanistan and Central Asia: A Modern History. London: Pearson
Education Limited, 2002.
Nogee, Joseph L. and Robert H. Donaldson. Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Fourth
Edition. New York: MacMillan, 1992.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “ISAF’S Mission in Afghanistan 2001-2014.” NATO.
September 1, 2015. Accessed April 16, 2020.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.h tm?selectedLocale=en.
Obama, Barack. Speech, U.S. Military Academy at West Point, December 1, 2009. Accessed
April 20, 2020. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarkspresident-addres s-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan.
Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms. Washington DC: The Joint Staff).
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pu bs/dictionary.pdf.
Owens. Mackubin Thomas. “The Main Thing.” The National Review, March 28, 2003.
https://www.nationalreview.com/2003/03/main-thing-mackubin-thomas-owens/.
Oxford Encyclopedia of American Military and Diplomatic History. Edited by Paul S. Boyer.
Accessed April 17, 2020. Oxford University Press, Inc., 2013.

104

Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199891580.001.0001/acref97801998 91580-e-1951?rskey=Sjc8rZ&result=1873.
Pear, Robert. “Arming Afghan Guerrillas: A Huge Effort Led by U.S.” The New York Times,
April 18, 1988. Accessed April 15, 2020.
https://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/18/world/arming- afghan-guerrillas-a-huge-effort-ledby-us.html?auth=.
“People need peace, not Stingers.” Newsweek, October 12, 1987.
Perry, Walter L. and David Kassing, Toppling the Taliban: Air-Ground Operations in
Afghanistan, October 2001–June 2002. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015.
Accessed April 19, 2020. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR381.html.
Petraeus, David H., James F. Amos. Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency. Washington D.C.:
Dept. of the Army, 2006.
Potholm, Christian P. Winning at War: Seven Keys to Military Victory Throughout History.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010.
Potholm, Christian P. Understanding War. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2016.
Powell, Colin. My American Journey. New York: Random House, 1995.
Powell, Colin L. “U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead.” Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992/93. Accessed
April 18, 2020. https://www.cfr.org/ world/us-forces-challenges-ahead/p7508.
“Powell’s Doctrine, in Powell’s Words,” Washington Post, October 7, 2001. Accessed April 18,
2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2001/10/07/powells-doctrinein-powel ls-words/e8fd 25c 5-a97f-4550-8cbd-0588eb4a9d8e/.
Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2000.
Reagan, Ronald. National Security Directive Number 166. “U.S. Policy, Programs, and Strategy
in Afghanistan.” U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, March 27, 1985.
Accessed April 18, 2020.
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/archives/reference/scanned-nsdd
s/nsdd166.pdf.
"A Report by Soviet Military Intelligence." September 1, 1981. Accessed April 19, 2020. History
and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. Translated by Gary Goldberg.
https://digitalarchive. wilsoncenter.org/document/111796.

105

Reuters. “U.S. Commander in Afghanistan Calls For More Troops.” Radio Free Europe Radio
Liberty. January 16, 2007. Accessed April 16, 2020.
https://www.rferl.org/a/1074051.html.
Rich, Paul B., and Isabelle Duyvesteyn. “The Study of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency.” In
The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. London: Routledge,
2012.
Rubin, Barnett R. Afghanistan From the Cold War Through the War on Terror. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2013.
Rubin, Barnett R. “Afghanistan: The Forgotten Crisis.” Writenet, December 1996. Accessed
April 14, 2020. https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6c0c.html.
Rumsfeld, Donald H. Annual Report to the President and the Congress. 2002. Accessed April
19, 2020.
https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/2002_DoD_AR.pdf?
ver=2014-06-2 4-15 3732-117.
Russian General Staff. The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Edited and
translated by Lester Grau and Michael Gress. University Press of Kansas, 2002.
Salahuddin, Sayed. “Karzai Offers Talks with Taliban to End Bloodshed.” Reuters, January 29,
2007. Accessed April 20, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghan-reconciliationidUSIS L2347520070129.
Sarkees, Meredith Reid, and Frank Whelon Wayman. Resort To War: A Data Guide to InterState, Extra-State, Intra-State, and Non-State Wars, 1816-2007. Washington, D.C.: CQ
Press, 2010.
Snegirev, Vladimir and Valery Samunin. The Dead End: The Road to Afghanistan. Translated
and edited by Svetlana Savranskaya and Malcolm Byrne. National Security Archive,
2012. Accessed April 18, 2020.
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB396/Full%20Text%20 Virus%20A.pdf.
Schuurman, Paul. "Clausewitz on Real War." Peace Review 26, no.3 (2014): 372-379.
"Soviet Communication to the Hungarian Leadership on the Situation in Afghanistan." March
28, 1979. Accessed April 18, 2020. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive,
National Archives of Hungary. Translated by Attila Kolontari and Zsofia Zelnik.
https://digitalarchive.wils oncenter.org/document/113160.
"Summary of a Meeting on Afghanistan." December 10, 1979. Accessed April 18, 2020. History
and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. Translated by Gary Goldberg.
https://digitalarchive. wilsoncenter.org/document/111780.

106

Stanton, Doug. Horse Soldiers: The Extraordinary Story of a Band of U. S. Soldiers Who Rode to
Victory in Afghanistan. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009.
Trofimov, Yaroslav. “Soviets' Afghan Ordeal Vexed Gates on Troop-Surge Plan.” The Wall
Street Journal. Dow Jones & Company, November 30, 2009.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB12 5831141804049337.
Tse-Tung, Mao. On Guerrilla Warfare. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith. New York: Praeger,
1961.
U.N. Security Council. “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the
Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions.” December 5, 2001. Accessed
April 16, 2020.
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/AF_011205_AgreementProvisio
n alArrangementsinAfghanistan%28en%29.pdf.
“US: Taliban Has Grown Fourfold.” Al Jazeera. October 9, 2009. Accessed April 16, 2020. http
s://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2009/10/20091091814483962.html.
Waldman, Thomas. “Clausewitz and the Study of War.” Defence Studies 12, no. 3 (September
2012): 345-374. Accessed April 14, 2020. DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2012.703843.
Whitlock, Craig. “At War With the Truth.” Washington Post. December 9, 2019. Accessed April
18, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistanpapers/afg hanistan-war-confi dential-documents/.
Whitlock, Craig. “Stranded Without a Strategy.” Washington Post. December 9, 2019. Accessed
April 18, 2020.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-paper
s/afghanistan- war-strategy/.
Yousaf, Mohammad and Mark Adkin. Afghanistan: The Bear Trap - The Defeat of a
Superpower. Pennsylvania: Casemate, 2001.
Brzeziński, Zbigniew to the President [Jimmy Carter]. Memorandum. “Reflections on Soviet
Intervention in Afghanistan.” December 26, 1979. Accessed April 18, 2020.
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB396/docs/19791226%20Brzezinski%20t
o%2 0Carter%20on%20Af ghanistan.pdf.

107

